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AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF TAX
Kitty Richards*
The tax code is full of ineffective, inefficient, inequitable, or other-
wise problematic provisions that make little sense when evaluated
through the lens of traditional tax policy analysis, yet remain popular
with citizens and legislators alike. The tax literature is equally full of
carefully-researched, technically precise, and theoretically sound pro-
posals for reform that nonetheless fail to get traction in the public de-
bate. Why?
What tax scholarship is missing is the importance of social mean-
ing: what do our tax laws say about our society's values, and how is
taxation being used to construct cultural ideals in contested spaces?
This Article applies expressive theory, well developed in the crimi-
nal and constitutional law literature, to a series of tax policy puzzles,
demonstrating how attention to social meaning can help to explain other-
wise inexplicable behavior by legislators and policymakers, and can al-
low scholars to engage more productively in the policy process. From
the tax treatment of Nevada's legal brothels to tax preferences for retire-
ment savings, social meaning matters, and frequently dominates tradi-
tional tax policy concerns. This observation has far-reaching
implications for tax scholarship, policy design, and advocacy.
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"The distribution of the subsidies from income split-
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AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF TAX
"But dollars are not all that matters; ideology is at
stake in the drafting of changes in the income tax law."
- Phyllis Schlafly 2
"How should we tax? Who should we tax? What
should we tax? What values does our tax system
reflect?"
- Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn3
INTRODUCTION
Why do politicians keep getting tax policy so wrong? Why is the
code littered with inefficient, ineffective incentives? Why do so many
voters support tax policies that are not only poorly designed, but against
their own self-interest? The legal literature is full of systematic explora-
tions of the moral underpinnings and structural workings of taxation,
often with strong policy prescriptions attached, yet these questions re-
main largely unanswered. Time and again, inefficient, ineffective tax
policies withstand withering scholarly critiques, and calls for common
sense reforms fall on deaf ears. Where tax law cannot be explained using
the dominant modes of tax policy analysis, it is frequently chalked up to
policymaker corruption, special interest capture, or, when all else fails,
ignorance. This is a mistake.
In this Article I offer a diagnosis and a prescription. Tax scholarship
is missing a crucial piece of the puzzle: social meaning. Like every other
area of law, tax law offers policymakers a chance to give expression to
the values of their constituents and themselves-and the values ex-
pressed by the tax code are at least as central to the tax policy prefer-
ences of citizens, lawmakers, and judges as economic efficiency and the
distribution of income.
This Article develops an expressive theory of tax and demonstrates
its utility to scholars and policymakers. Section I describes expressive
theory as it has been applied in other fields of law, then discusses tradi-
tional tax policy analysis and its isolation from expressive theory. Sec-
tion II demonstrates the utility of expressive theory to understanding and
shaping tax policy outcomes by turning to a set of legislative and court
actions that cannot be fully explained by traditional tax policy, but make
perfect sense when viewed as at least partially (and in some cases prima-
rily) motivated by expressive concerns.
2 Phyllis Schlafly, The Hidden Meaning of Marriage Tax Repeal, THE EAGLE FORUM
(Mar. 7, 2001), http://eagleforum.org/column/2001/marl/01-03-07.shtmil.
3 MICHAEL J. GRArz AND LN SHAPIRO, Death by a Thousand Cuts: the Fight Over
Taxing Inherited Wealth 43 (2005) (quoting Congresswoman Jennifer Dunn).
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Why are lawmakers in Nevada dead set against taxing the state's
legal brothel industry, while the "ranch" owners cry out to pay their fair
share? Why, in the midst of implementing drastic austerity measures did
the Tories make introducing a tax preference for married couples into the
British tax code a central piece of their platform, even though David
Cameron himself did not believe it would cause more people to marry?
Why have Americans rallied around "marriage penalty relief' that is
costly and poorly targeted, while better-targeted proposals with the
power to correct a number of inefficiencies in the taxation of married
couples get short shrift? Why have judges routinely, but inconsistently,
disallowed otherwise clearly appropriate business deductions because
they "frustrate public policy?"
All of these questions can be answered once one takes account of
the social meaning of the taxes being debated, and the ways in which the
various actors understand, value, and shape (or fail to shape) this social
meaning. In some cases, expressive concerns are dominant (or even ex-
clusive) drivers of the debate; in others the expressive component of the
law is more difficult to separate from more traditional tax policy con-
cerns, but no less relevant to the policy outcomes.
Section M shows that even debates premised on traditional tax pol-
icy analysis are often primarily arguments over the expressive power of
taxation. It is relatively rare for expressive concerns to sit right at the
surface-with politicians arguing over the "message" being sent by the
tax code. Frequently expressive concerns are hidden under layers of rhet-
oric about efficiency and incentives-the language of incentive (or "re-
ward," or "encourage") stands in for more culturally fraught arguments
about morality and values, even as these expressive concerns dominate
actual decisionmaking. This understanding of the "secret ambition of in-
centive" can explain a tax policy puzzle far removed from the obvious
cultural flashpoints of sex, marriage, drug trafficking, and racial discrim-
ination-the persistence in the federal income tax code (and persistent
popularity) of a slate of expensive, inefficient, and poorly-targeted retire-
ment savings incentives that are difficult to justify on traditional tax-
policy grounds.
Section IV illustrates how attention to social meaning can
strengthen tax policy design, both by informing policy analysis and ad-
vocacy (in this case, lending support to structural changes in the taxation
of intergenerational wealth transfers) and by encouraging policymakers
to express "correct" social meaning in the tax code in ways that minimize
negative side effects.
AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF TAX
I. THE ISOLATION OF EXPRESSIVE THEORY AND TAX
A. Expressive Theory and Its Avoidance of Tax Law
Expressive theories of law take notice of the social meaning of ac-
tivities and behaviors, and locate law within the context of these social
meanings. 4 Essentially, expressive theory argues that what the law says,
about who and what our society values, matters. One limited version of
expressive theory links this feature of the law directly to the law's role in
shaping behavior-the law's expression of social values enunciates so-
cial norms that then shape behavior, independent of the official sanction
tied to the law. On this account, the law's expressive value is simply an
added mechanism by which law achieves the instrumental goals of pun-
ishing, deterring, or encouraging specific behavior. 56
This Article fits into the broader conception of expressive theory
prominent in the criminal and constitutional law literature.7 Under this
account, the law not only shapes behavior via penalties and rewards, it
also serves to express societal values and approval of (possibly con-
tested) social norms in a way that is valued by citizens and policymakers
independent of the instrumental function of the law. An expressive the-
ory in this mold can be a normative framework, but it is also a compel-
4 Lawrence Lessig defines "social meaning" as follows: "Any society or social context
has what I call here social meanings-the semiotic content attached to various actions, or
inactions, or statuses, within a particular context. If an action creates a stigma, that stigma is a
social meaning. If a gesture is an insult, that insult is a social meaning." Lawrence Lessig, The
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 951-952 (1995). He goes on to pro-
vide the example of buckling a seatbelt: in early 1990's Budapest, buckling your seatbelt in a
taxi was seen as an insult to the driver. The insult is the social meaning of the act. The same
act in contemporary America likely has a very different social meaning. Similarly, tipping a
bellhop is a sign of respect, while tipping a doctor could be seen as demeaning, and tipping a
police officer is deeply problematic. Wearing your seatbelt and tipping someone for good
service are both acts that can have myriad social meanings attached depending on context.
5 Two 1996 papers by Cass Sunstein illustrate well this conception of expressive law. In
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, Sunstein explores the use of law
in norm management, arguing that, "at least for purposes of law, any support for 'statements'
should be rooted not simply in the intrinsic value of the statement, but also in plausible judg-
ments about its effect on social norms and hence in 'on balance' judgments about its conse-
quences." (at 2045). He furthers this argument in Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 903 (1996), arguing that "norm management" can be a cost-effective mechanism
through which government can incentivize socially valuable behaviors and deter socially
costly behaviors.
6 See also, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive
Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 133, 133-34 (2003) ("[Clriminal laws prevent crime
not only by applying legal sanctions to disfavored actions, but also by facilitating the applica-
tion of nonlegal sanctions, such as gossip, ostracism, and loss of employment."); Mark
Tushnet and Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DuKE L.J.
1 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, New and Critical Approaches to Law and Economics (Part
II) Norms Theory: And Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000).
7 See infra notes 8-18.
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ling positive framework for understanding the values and desires that
animate policy debates and legal opinions. This also makes it a powerful
practical tool for developing policies that can withstand political and ju-
dicial processes that would seem irrational if expressive concerns were
not taken into account.
In the constitutional law context, expressive theory has been used to
explain the Supreme Court's analysis in a number of fields where the
court has rejected legal rules that inflict "expressive harms" by convey-
ing distasteful or inappropriate valuations of people or behavior. This
type of consideration, expressive theorists have argued, has been para-
mount in the Supreme Court's equal protection and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.8 In the equal protection sphere, they point to the post-
Brown v. Board orders desegregating public spaces 9, and the Court's ex-
clusive focus "on the laws' history and meaning, not on their specific
cultural or psychological effects,"10 in striking down anti-miscegenation
laws in Loving v. Virginia." In the Establishment Clause context, the
Court has ruled sectarian nativity scenes on public property unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that "'[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadher-
ents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fa-
vored members of the political community' . . . Whether state action
actually makes nonadherents feel like pariahs is irrelevant."1 2 This is a
strong example of expressive concerns driving the Court's doctrine well
beyond the instrumental effect of the expression.
In the criminal law context, Dan Kahan has used expressive theory
to explain the failure of attempts to substitute alternative sanctions, such
as drug treatment, fines and community service, for costly, inhumane and
ineffective regimes of imprisonment.' 3 He argues persuasively that any
8 For a comprehensive analysis, see Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, Ex-
pressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000).
9 While the Court pointed to segregation's possible empirical effects on the self-esteem
of black children in Brown v. Board (Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n. 11
(1954)), no such appeal to real-world effect can be found in the cascade of decisions desegre-
gating myriad other public spaces. Anderson and Pildes, supra note 8 at 1543. Instead, the
court focuses on the bare expression of racial separation and status hierarchy as the harm of the
law.
10 Anderson and Pildes, supra note 8 at 1543.
11 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
12 Anderson and Pildes, supra note 8 at 1547 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
at 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
13 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 592
(1996). Under this account, the public does not reject the use of fines, for example, to punish
many crimes because of a strong sense that they will be ineffective deterrents, nor because
they fail to create sufficient hardship from a retributive point of view, but because they express
to a wrongdoer: "you may do what you have done, but you must pay for the privilege." Id. at
593. Community service is not an acceptable alternative to incarceration because it does not
unambiguously express condemnation-it involves offenders in "activities that conventionally
AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF TAX
proposed reform that gives expression to offensive values is doomed to
fail even if it is a superior deterrent or retributive option. Sanctions that
convey inappropriate expressions of value are offensive in themselves,
regardless of their deterrent effects or the material or dignitary harm they
impose on wrongdoers. 14
Expressive theory has been used to explain heated battles over many
culturally-charged statutes, from sodomy laws,15 to flag desecration stat-
utes,1 6 and to understand the contours of public reaction to court rulings
that express inappropriate valuation of different people or groups. 17
Despite the extensive use of expressive theory in the criminal and
constitutional law scholarship through the early 2000s, scholars of ex-
pressive theory largely ignored tax law and policy. In fact, when tax law
occasionally appeared in an expressive theorist's work, it was as an ex-
ample of an area of law likely to be immune from expressive analysis.'s
This omission is a serious oversight. As this Article will show, tax
policy debates have provided some of the most compelling examples of
expressive law at work over the last few decades.
entitle people to respect and admiration"-and because, to many, the use of community ser-
vice as punishment in fact "devalues community service, denigrates the virtue of those who
perform it, and shows contempt for the interests of those whom it is supposed to benefit." Id.
at 627.
14 "The political unacceptability of alternative sanctions . . . reflects their inadequacy
along the expressive dimension of punishment. The public reflects the alternatives not because
they perceive that these punishments won't work or aren't severe enough, but because they fail
to express condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as imprisonment." Id. at 592.
15 Sodomy laws are rarely enforced, but their continued existence causes expressive
harm, as they are seen to "proclaim the message that society hates homosexuals, whoever that
category happens to encompass and whatever those people happen to do in bed." Terry S.
Kogan, Legislative Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 209, 233
(1992). See also Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social
Norms and Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 (2001), for an examination of the way that
sodomy laws shape social structure and individual behavior through their construction of so-
cial meaning.
16 See generally ROBERT JusTIN GOLDSTEIN, BURNING THE FLAG: THE GREAT
1989-1990 AMERICAN FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY (1996).
17 See e.g. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REv. 413,
421, nn. 21-24 and accompanying text (1999). To representatives of the National Organiza-
tion for Women, the lenient sentencing of three young men convicted of sexually abusing their
developmentally disabled classmate spoke volumes: "The clear message to women is the crime
of rape is not a crime worthy of punishment. It's a blow to women today." Robert Hanley, 3
Are Sentenced to Youth Center Over Sex Abuse of Retarded Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1993,
at 1:1. Similarly, to gay rights groups, a Utah judge's lenient treatment of a defendant accused
of murdering a gay man in a homophobic rage (allowing the defendant to plead to manslaugh-
ter, and imposing an unusually light sentence), expressed contempt for the lives of gay people:
"What Judge Young has said is that it's O.K. to kill faggots ... This is beyond insult." Judge
Draws Protests After Cutting Sentence of Gay Man's Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at
Al5.
18 See Kahan, supra note 17, at 435-36 n.87 (1999): "There may be some forms of
behavior-perhaps speeding or tax evasion-on which moral and cultural disagreement is
minimal (if not nonexistent) and on which instrumental issues loom much larger."
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B. Tax Scholarship's Isolation from Expressive Theory
The three bedrocks of traditional tax policy analysis are generally
described as "equity, efficiency, and administrability/simplicity." 19 This
is how most introductory tax students are taught to analyze tax policies,
with each of these three criteria fleshed out and weighed against the
others, 20 and these are the typical criteria used in the tax literature to
evaluate different policy options. Yet the tax code consistently fails to
conform to scholarly opinion on what optimal taxation would look like in
any given scenario. Tax scholars frequently reference public choice the-
ory to explain this failure.21 Under this analysis, clearly superior tax poli-
cies (from a traditional equity/efficiency/simplicity point of view) are
defeated by concentrated special interests with money and influence.
Tax scholars at times have recognized the "symbolic" purposes of
legislative action, 22 as a supplement to public choice theory and tradi-
tional policy analysis. Under this account, legislators maximize their
chances of reelection by engaging in the theater of legislating, thereby
demonstrating to constituents that they are "doing something" about sali-
ent issues, and gain gratification and prestige by demonstrating their
power.23 This symbolic function of tax law, while certainly important,
should not be confused with the expressive function of tax law, in which
19 See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98
CORNELL L. REV 417, 524 (citing Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 498 (2009)).
20 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETz AND DEBORAH SCHENK, FEDERAL TAX INCOME: PRINCI-
PLES AND PoLICIEs 28 (7th ed. 2013).
21 See, e.g., Fleischer supra note 19, at 497-498 (noting that "proposals that are appeal-
ing in terms of the traditional tax policy goals of equity, efficiency, and administrability may
not always survive the legislative process.") (citing JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MUR-
RAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF
TAX REFORM (1987)); S.S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax
Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1957).
22 The foundational work in this area is Daniel Shaviro's Beyond Public Choice and
Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the
1980s, 139 U. PENN. LAW. REV. 1 (1990).
23 "In many cases, Congress legislates because its members and others who influence it
value and benefit from the activity of legislating. The reasons for such behavior can be divided
into two categories. First, proposing and enacting legislation is a means of symbolic communi-
cation with members of the general public, of causing them to like a politician without the
inconvenience (and possible political inconsequence) of actually having to benefit them tangi-
bly. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can promote reelection. Second, suc-
ceeding legislatively is a means of exercising and demonstrating one's power. It is inherently
gratifying (as when an emperor enjoys seeing statues of himself), and it increases one's pres-
tige and status in political circles. Thus, without regard to its actual effects, legislation can
promote self-interested goals apart from reelection." Id. at 8 (referencing MURRAY EDELMAN,
THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964)); C. ELDER AND R. COBB, THE POLrrlCAL USES OF
SYMBO S (1983).
AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF TAX
the expression of appropriate values in the code provides real benefits to
favored groups and society. 2 4
The tax literature does not, by and large, pay attention to expressive
theory as either a positive framework for understanding legislative and
judicial outcomes or public opinion, or as a contribution to the normative
theory of what tax law should be.
When expressive theory does make an appearance in the tax litera-
ture, it is generally the narrow, norm-management form of expressive
theory, in which expression of cultural values in the code is a means to
more traditional instrumental ends. For example, in Alternative Sanctions
in the Federal Tax Code, Michael S. Kirsh explores "public shaming and
immigration law-banishment" sanctions for tax avoiders "from three per-
spectives: their instrumental effects, their expressive function in altering
social norms, and their role as symbolic legislation." 25 Professor Kirsh
lays out probably the most extensive review of expressive theories of law
found in the tax literature:
The use of alternative sanctions in the context of the fed-
eral tax law might also be justified based on their expres-
sive effects. A considerable body of recent legal
scholarship addresses the expressive function of legisla-
tion. As the term is used herein, a statute reflects expres-
sive functions if it is intended to change its target's
conduct not by increasing the cost of engaging in unde-
sirable behavior, but by altering social norms. This alter-
24 See Sara Sun Beale, 80 B.U. LAW REv. 1227 at 1254 (2000) (distinguishing the ex-
pressive function of criminal law from its symbolic function in the context of federal hate
crimes legislation):
One of the most important arguments in support of the Kennedy proposal and the
creation of the new federal hate crime has been the need to "send a message." Many
of the witnesses at the congressional hearings as well as the Senators who partici-
pated in the debates saw this as a central function of the Kennedy proposal. Propo-
nents of this view have identified two key aspects of the message sent by the
Kennedy proposal (and other hate crime legislation). First, it expresses strong social
condemnation of bias crimes. Second, the condemnation of hate crimes implies a
general affirmation of the societal value of the groups targeted by hate crimes and a
recognition of their rightful place in society. Hate crimes legislation is seen as rein-
forcing the community's commitment to equality among all citizens.
Analyzing these arguments under the rubric of symbolic politics assumes that
symbolic action (like sending a message) is an empty form of reassurance. This
section explores the possibility that law may play a valuable role in denouncing
undesirable conduct and reinforcing desirable values. Using criminal law for these
purposes finds support in classical work on the function of the criminal law as well
as more recent scholarship on the expressive function of law and the role law can
play in the shaping of norms and in the allocation of social capital.
25 Michael S. Kirsh, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming
and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IowA L. REv. 863,
913 (2004).
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ation in social norms may affect the target's behavior by
causing him to internalize the new norm, changing his
preferences, or in some other way. 2 6
The Article goes on to summarize the expressive literature as it relates to
the law's power to alter behavior through a norm-management mecha-
nism. But Professor Kirsh misses the independent value of cultural ex-
pression through the law, even where it is discussed in the cited
literature.2728 This is the core mistake made by most of the small number
of tax scholars who reference expressive theory in their work.29
Inattention to the expression of social meaning in the tax code
causes tax scholars to misapprehend the nature of a number of important
tax policy debates. It leaves us puzzled at legislative and judicial out-
comes, unable to advance optimal policies, and deaf to the very real ex-
pressive benefits and harms that come along with different approaches to
tax policy. I will argue that expressive theory is at the heart of many tax
policy debates.
II. EXPRESSIVE TAX
To demonstrate the importance of expressive theory to understand-
ing tax policy it may help to start with an extreme case where legislative
26 Id. at 913, citing Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2181 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). For critiques of the various theories of the expressive role of
legislation, see generally Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Over-
view, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000) and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories
of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1613 n.22 (2000).
27 For example, Professor Kirsh extensively quotes Dan Kahan's What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean (supra note 13) but misses the core argument: expressive theory can be used
to bolster traditional analysis (in this case retributivism and deterrence in criminal law) but is
distinguishable, and that clear expression of condemnation of wrongdoing has independent
value to society from any resultant behavior modification (deterrence value), and that inatten-
tion to the meaning of alternative sanctions such as fines, community service, and drug treat-
ment is the reason that they have not been adopted even in contexts where they are equivalent
in their deterrence value to imprisonment. See supra note 14.
28 To be fair, Professor Kirsh provides a disclaimer: "This Article does not purport to set
out a complete summary and analysis of the competing theories on the expressive function of
law. Rather, this Article briefly addresses several of the recent theories that envision the ex-
pressive function of law causing changes in an individual's behavior through the alteration of
social norms and analyzes the extent to which those theories explain alternative sanctions in
the context of tax-motivated expatriation." Id. at n.218. But this selective deployment of
expressive theory pervades the literature, to its detriment. Also note that professor Kirsh ex-
tensively discusses the "symbolic" use of tax law as it pertains to alternative sanctions for
noncompliance. Id. at 922.
29 But see, e.g., the works of Marjorie Kornhauser (e.g. infra note 63, at 650-53) on
taxes and gender norms. Many writers have discussed the role of the tax code in constructing
and reinforcing racial, gender, and class hierarchies, but this tax criticism is not primarily
grounded in expressive theory.
AN ExPREssIVE THEORY OF TAX
action is obviously based on a desire to express values in a contested
field -where what the tax code says is explicitly preferenced over what
the code does, even as every traditional tax policy concern points in the
opposite direction. Such a case exists, in the debate over the taxation of
brothels in Nevada.
A. The Wages of Sin: Nontaxation of Nevada's Legal Sex Trade
Prostitution has been legal and regulated in Nevada since the state
entered the Union in 1864, though a 1971 law excluded the sex trade
from Reno and Las Vegas by prohibiting prostitution in counties with
more than 200,000 residents (later increased to 400,000).30 Legal prosti-
tution is regulated at the local level, through city and county ordinances,
and generally confined to locally-licensed brothels known as "ranches."
While precise revenue figures are closely guarded by brothel owners, the
industry is thought to gross tens of millions of dollars a year.3 1 Taxes on
these receipts represent a substantial revenue source for many small
counties, yet the brothels are not subject to state-level business taxes, and
the sexual transactions occurring on the premises are not subject to state
sales taxes.32 Why the favorable tax treatment?
This is not a story of powerful business interests extracting tax
breaks from state governments wary of losing valuable industries to other
states. Quite the contrary; the most vocal advocate for state taxation of
the Nevada brothel industry has been George Flint, a longtime lobbyist
for the Nevada Brothel Owner's Association. The Brothel lobby has
been begging to be taxed at the state level for at least twenty years, but
while each cyclical downturn in state tax revenues leads to new hearings
and renewed debate, the Brothel industry's cries have gone unheeded.
The state legislature refuses to include prostitution in the state's tax base.
A 1991 hearing appearance by Mustang Ranch owner Joe Conforte, in
which he argued that it was the brothel industry's patriotic duty to pay
more in taxes,33 failed to convince lawmakers to accept his proposal for a
"bedroom tax," which would have levied a sales tax on brothel services.
During the state budget crisis of 2003, the brothel lobby again urged
lawmakers to levy state taxes on their businesses, this time arguing that
prostitution services should be included in a pending "live entertainment
30 Daria Snadowsky, The Best Little Whorehouse Is Not in Texas: How Nevada's Prosti-
tution Laws Serve Public Policy, and How those Laws May Be Improved, 6 NEv. L.J. 217, at
219, 222 (2005).
31 Steven Freiss, Brothels Ask to Be Taxed, But Official Sees a Catch, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
26, 2009, at All.
32 Id. Note that other transactions, such as liquor sales in brothel bars, or souvenir
purchases, are subject to state sales tax (e.g. infra note 39).
33 David McGrath-Schwartz, Brothel Industry Says 'Tax Us;' State Says Thanks, but No
Thanks, LAS VEGAS SUN, Dec. 21, 2008.
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tax." They were again turned down. In 2005, the industry offered yet
another new brothel tax proposal, projected to raise $1 million in revenue
through a special "entry fee" coupled with an excise tax on non-sexual
purchases (liquor, souvenirs, etc). No dice. Even the recent unparalleled
state budget crisis, in which Nevada struggled to close a total fiscal year
2011 budget shortfall equal to half of the state's general fund, 34 did not
soften state legislators' attitudes.
Applying traditional tax policy analysis to this situation would lead
one to a number of potential explanations. It is possible that Nevada leg-
islators believe strongly that prostitution services, at least as provided in
the small number of legally-sanctioned ranches, are socially or economi-
cally beneficial and thus should be subsidized by the tax code. Under this
theory, non-taxation is a means to reduce the net cost and increase the
supply of sexual services. Another plausible theory under traditional tax
policy analysis is that lawmakers in Nevada are concerned about the dis-
tributional effects of taxing brothels. There is little data available on the
income distribution among patrons of Nevada's ranches, but if legislators
believe that sexual services are generally disproportionately consumed
by lower-income individuals, they could be concerned about increasing
taxes on this population. Alternatively, if they believe that the brothel
market is such that the incidence of the tax would fall on sex workers
themselves, and that these workers are likely to be lower-income or oth-
erwise disadvantaged, that concern could lead to favorable tax treatment
for sexual services. Additionally, legislators could be concerned about
horizontal inequities among similarly-situated taxpayers with different
consumption mixes-though that would argue for harmonizing taxes
across goods and services, not carving out exceptions for sexual services.
There is no evidence, however, that legislators feel that taxing
brothels would be economically damaging, or reduce socially beneficial
activities, or create horizontal or vertical inequities. In fact, just as the
push for a brothel tax comes from an unlikely source, resistance to
brothel taxes comes predominantly from critics of Nevada's prostitution
industry, even though the current tax regime treats spending on the sex
trade favorably compared to other consumption.
In fact, the debate over the taxation of Nevada's brothels is domi-
nated by explicit concern with the purely expressive value of taxation-
what does state-level taxation "say" about the value placed on the brothel
industry by the state.
34 Phil Oliff, Chris Mai and Vincent Palacios, States Continue to Feel Recession's Im-
pact, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIEs (updated June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp
.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=711.
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1. It's Bad Enough It's Legal: What Taxation Says About
Prostitution
While they disagree about policy, all sides of the argument agree
about what is at stake: it all comes down to "legitimacy." The Reno Ga-
zette-Journal editorial board registered their opposition to brothel taxes
in 2009:
But, for the brothel industry, it's not about the money.
Rather it's about the legitimacy that comes with being
involved in a state-recognized taxpaying business. As
much as the state needs the additional money, Nevada
cannot afford to give the brothel industry the legitimacy
it seeks.. . Yes, Nevada may continue to tolerate prosti-
tution, but the state should never profit from it.
Shady Lady Ranch owner Bobbi Davis supports a brothel tax because
"there's a price, sometimes, for legitimacy." 36 Bunny Ranch owner Den-
nis Hof, on the other hand, opposes state taxation because "brothels pay
their fair share and should not have to 'pay for legitimacy.'" 3 7
Then-governor Kenny Guinn shied away from the 2005 debate; his
spokesman confirmed that the Governor felt "that he would be affirming
the industry if he came out in support of the bill."3 8 Even the sponsor of
the 2005 brothel tax bill, Assemblywoman Sheila Leslie (D-Reno), ex-
pressed concern that imposing a state tax on brothels would help legiti-
mize the business. 39 State Senator Dina Titus (D-Las Vegas) supports
brothel taxation, but is nonetheless disturbed by the expressive power of
such a policy: "'I would certainly vote for it. . . But the reason they want
to be taxed is it legitimizes them even more. We have totally abandoned
the family atmosphere in Nevada.' "40 Jim Gibbons, governor of Nevada
during the financial crisis and subsequent recession, was so uncomforta-
ble with the legal status of prostitution in his state that he opposed any
move that would even acknowledge that the sex trade was already a legal
enterprise. During budget deliberations in the spring of 2009, he stated
35 Reno Gazette-Journal Editorial Board, Editorial, Nevada shouldn't benefit frorn prosti-
tution business, RENO GAZETTE-JoURNAL, Apr. 8, 2009.
36 Kathleen Hennessey, Nevada Brothels Lobby to Be Taxed; State Turns Down Unusual
Strategy To Secure Future, THE WASH. POST, May 15, 2005.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Ray Hagar, Brothel Owners Offer Own Tax Proposal, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Mar.
24, 2005, at A3.
40 Ed Vogel, Prostitution Lobbyist Faithful To Cause, LAS VEGAS REv. J., Dec. 22,
2003, at lB.
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"I'm not a supporter of legalizing prostitution in Nevada. So by taxing it,
there's a recognition of the legality of it."41
The debate over brothel taxes is a relatively straightforward battle
over the expressive capital of taxation. While brothels are legal in Ne-
vada, they are still widely regarded as an unsavory element of Nevada's
economy. To the participants in the tax debate, inclusion in the state tax
base represents explicit inclusion in the state's "respectable" economy,
and contribution to the state's fiscal stability is a laudable, even "patri-
otic" activity. This is the uncontested social meaning of taxation within
this context. What is contested is who should be entitled to the valuable
social capital conferred by taxation. The brothel industry is willing to
pay dearly for the chance to participate positively in the public life of the
state and receive the social status that attends such participation. Oppo-
nents of legal prostitution are willing to sacrifice scarce revenue, even in
the face of debilitating budget cuts, 4 2 because they are unwilling to grant
this type of social status to people and activities they find distasteful.
While cultural status is a valuable good in itself, it is not necessary
to argue here that there is nothing at stake beyond pure social status. The
brothel lobby undoubtedly believes that the legitimacy gained through
inclusion in the tax base will be in some way profitable. Perhaps it will
lead to reduced stigma and higher revenues, or make future attempts to
criminalize prostitution statewide more difficult. Legislators are cer-
tainly also aware of these potential repercussions. But notice that even
these economic effects are achieved through expressive means, not
through the direct material effects of the tax code.
2. Dirty Money: What Taxing Prostitution Says About the State
In addition to what taxation says about the brothel industry, many
participants in the debate are deeply concerned about what taxing broth-
els will say about the government of Nevada. Senator Titus' concern
about abandoning the "family atmosphere in Nevada," was echoed by
Melissa Farley, a psychologist who testified at the 2009 brothel tax hear-
ings that the legislation was "an act of legislative pimping," that would
"damage the reputation of the state of Nevada." 43 As Flint put it at the
41 Ashley Powers, Tax Debate Has Many Squirming; Potential Brothels Levy Reopens
Discussion Of Their Place In Nevada, Cm. TRIs., Apr. 8, 2009.
42 Many do not feel that this trade-off is worth it. See e.g. CJ Corley, Letter to the
Editor, What's with legislators turning down taxes?, RENO GAZETrE-JOURNAL, May 6, 2009
(" . . . when an industry goes to our legislators and "offers" to be taxed, does it really make
sense to say 'no thanks?' . . . How can Nevadans allow our legislators to turn down taxes that
would be generated by legal businesses in this state, while threatening to lay off workers to
help balance the budget?").
43 Ray Hagar, Brothel Owners Reluctantly Support Sex Tax Legislation, RENO GAZETrE-
JOURNAL, Apr. 8, 2009, at A4.
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beginning of the legislature's deliberation over the fiscal year 2010
budget, "Certain people almost get the hives when you bring us up... I
was talking to the speaker of the Assembly the other day, and she told
me, 'As bad as it is, we're not hurting so much we want to use that kind
of money.' "' Apparent state acceptance of prostitution reflects posi-
tively on the brothel industry, but has a reciprocal negative effect on the
status of Nevada in the eyes of prostitution's opponents. This expressive
consequence can be particularly salient in the tax context, where the law
involves transfer of money between the state and private actors. To
those who find the brothels distasteful, or worthy of strong moral con-
demnation, acceptance of "tainted" tax revenues would be tantamount to
state investment in the industry. As reported in the Las Vegas Sun,
"some politicians have said, the brothel money would somehow stain the
good, clean dollars used to pay for schools and safety net (from the
wholesome casino and construction industries)." 4 5 This concern is typi-
fied by the Reno Gazette-Journal's editorial admonition that the state
"should never profit" from prostitution. It underlies Dr. Farley's belief
that taxation of prostitution would involve the state in "pimping," and
"economic exploitation" of sex workers.
For Nevada legislators, neither the revenues that could be generated
by including sex work in the state tax base nor the pro-prostitution incen-
tive effects of non-taxation of sexual services are as important as the
perceived expressive harms of "legitimizing" the sex trade by taxing it.
This example may represent the outer bounds of expressive taxa-
tion-it is rare that policymakers are so upfront about their expressive
concerns, and even rarer that the expressive concerns run so obviously
counter to more traditional concerns about revenue, incentives, and eq-
uity-but it is by no means unique.
Because the debate over taxing prostitution explicitly highlights ex-
pressive concerns, and because those expressive concerns clearly domi-
nate traditional approaches to analyzing tax policy, it makes it a good
starting point for our exploration. But once alert to expressive concerns,
the attentive scholar will find them motivating decisionmaking in nearly
every public debate over tax law.
44 McGrath-Schwartz, supra note 33.
45 David McGrath-Schwartz, Brothel Industry Falls Short in Desire to Pay State Taxes,
LAS VEGAS SUN (blog) (May 24, 2011), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/ 2011/may/24/
brothel-industry-falls-short-goal-pay-state-taxes/ (emphasis mine, sarcasm original).
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B. Marriage and the Tax Code
1. "Recognizing" Marriage: It's Not the Money, it's the
Message
In the United Kingdom, taxpayers file individually, and until re-
cently there was only very limited formal recognition of marriage in the
income tax code: a narrowly-targeted credit for certain elderly taxpayers
called the "Married Couple's Allowance," the ability to transfer assets to
your spouse tax-free (thus facilitating capital gains income-splitting), and
inheritance tax exemptions for surviving spouses. As part of their plat-
form for the 2010 parliamentary elections, the Tories proposed allowing
low-and-moderate income taxpayers (those paying the 20 percent "basic
rate") to transfer up to F750 of their unused personal allowance to their
spouse, resulting in up to a F150 tax break for married couples with a
single major breadwinner. In a speech given at a Demos think-tank con-
ference, prospective Prime Minister David Cameron touted the expres-
sive value of such a policy: "I think it is essential to say loudly and
proudly that commitment is a core value of a responsible society, and
that's why we will recognize marriage . . . in the tax system." 4 6 When
the effectiveness of a small tax benefit as a support for marriage was
questioned in a pre-election debate, Mr. Cameron affirmed the expres-
sive nature of the proposal, saying "it's not the money, it's the message."
In January 2011, after assuming the role of Prime Minister, Mr. Cameron
continued to call for a tax break for married couples on purely expressive
grounds: "I don't think people are going to rush out and get married
because there's a certain amount of money on offer every week, I just
think that we, as a country, should recognize the importance of commit-
ted relationships" 47
While expressing support for marriage and family values is a part of
the rhetoric of both major parties in the U.S., Mr. Cameron's statements
ignited a fiery debate in the U.K. over whether it is right for government
to value one type of family over another at all. In a Times of London op-
ed entitled "The Single Mother's Manifesto: David Cameron says the
'Nasty Party' that Castigated People Like Me Has Changed. I'm Not
Buying It," Harry Potter author J.K. Rowling pointed to the tax proposal
as a symptom of the Tories' distaste for and discrimination against single
parents, and a reflection of their lack of understanding of the problems
facing lone parents:
46 Nicholas Watt, Conservatives Commit To £150 Tax Break For Married Couples, THE
GuARDAN, Apr. 9, 2010, at 10. This quote has been edited for brevity and flow and I would
feel remiss if I didn't point out that the omitted section of the quote is a call for marriage
equality for gays and lesbians, to which Mr. Cameron has given his full-throated support.
47 Matt Chorley, Nick Clegg Ridicules Tax Break For Married Couples, THE INDEPEN-
DENT, Dec. 18, 2011.
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Even Mr Cameron seems to admit that he is offering
nothing more than a token gesture when he tells us "it's
not the money, it's the message". Nobody who has ever
experienced the reality of poverty could say "it's not the
money, it's the message". . . If Mr Cameron's only prac-
tical advice to women living in poverty, the sole carers
of their children, is "get married, and we'll give you
Pounds 150", he reveals himself to be completely igno-
rant of their true situation. . .*4
To Rowling, a former single mother who relied on government assis-
tance to feed her child, the Tory call for government to recognize and
value marriage represented "renewed marginalization of the single, the
divorced, and the widowed." 49 The chief executive of Gingerbread, a
U.K. organization dedicated to supporting lone parents and their children
bridled at the degradation of single-parent families implicit in the Tory
platform: "These are ordinary mums or dads who provide stable home
environments for their families. They deserve equal treatment, not mea-
sures that treat them as second class."50
These concerns were not limited to advocates for single parents.
The issue of recognizing marriage in the tax code became a serious point
of discord in the precarious Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition that
emerged after the 2010 election. In fact, the coalition agreement negoti-
ated between the parties had to make specific allowance for Liberal
Democratic Members of Parliament to abstain from budget resolutions
introducing the transferable-allowance without violating the terms of the
agreement.5 1 To Liberal Democratic leader Nick Clegg, the policy repre-
sents an unwarranted ideological intrusion into the private affairs of Brit-
ish citizens, and codifies retrograde attitudes about what the "right" kind
of family looks like. In December of 2011, as Mr. Cameron ramped up
his hearth-and-home rhetoric in time for the holiday season, Mr. Clegg
took the opportunity to attack the married-couple tax break, stating
bluntly, "The institutions of our society are constantly evolving . . . We
should not take a particular version of the family institution, such as the
1950s model of suit-wearing, bread-winning dad and aproned, homemak-
ing mother-and try and preserve it in aspic." 52
48 J.K. Rowling, The Single Mother's Manifesto, THE TmiEs of London, Apr. 14, 2010,
at 20.
49 Id.
50 Cameron Hints at Tax Break Amid Child Benefit Row, BBC NEws: UK POLmCS (Oct.
5, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11478320.
51 Her Majesty's Government: Cabinet Office, The Coalition: Our Programme For Gov-
ernment, § 29, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/coalition-pro
grammejfor-government.pdf.
52 Chorley, supra note 47.
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Like the Nevada brothel tax debate, the debate in the U.K. over
marriage and taxes has been couched in explicitly expressive terms. The
argument has not been primarily over whether the proposal will effec-
tively encourage family formation or formalization-not even its strong-
est supporters believe a £150 tax reduction will make a dent in Britain's
declining marriage rates. Instead, both proponents and opponents of the
proposal are concerned with the message that it sends about what types
of people and families are valued by British society and thus deserving of
government support. Proponents seek to venerate married couples (and
specifically single-breadwinner married couples), while opponents find
the concomitant devaluation of single parents offensive, and neither side
hides its expressive motivations. 53
The marriage allowance was finally introduced in late 2013 (at a
higher E220 maximum value), to become effective April 2015. Liberal
Democratic Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg instructed his party's
Members of Parliament not to block the measure 54, as part of a deal to
provide free school meals to young children, but both Liberal Democrats
and Labour quickly vowed to repeal the measure should they win power
after the following election.55
Thus far, the allowance has been significantly less costly than ex-
pected, because only about two in five eligible couples is receiving the
benefit.56 In Britain, 90 percent of taxpayers pay through the Pay As You
Earn exact withholding system, and 90 percent of these taxpayers do not
need to file any type of return.5 7 Thus, in order to claim the transferable
marriage allowance, a couple must proactively register with the revenue
authority.58 As further evidence that marginal incentives to marry are not
the main target of the policy, the government is attempting to increase
uptake and payouts by allowing taxpayers to claim the allowance retro-
53 The opposition also emphasizes the fiscal cost of the program-even if the expressive
harms to unmarried people aren't substantial, the government should not expend resources
expressing support for married families (e.g., Chorley, supra note 47).
54 Christopher Hope, Married couples to receive 11,000 tax break, THE TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10340987/Married-couples-to-re-
ceive-1000-tax-break.html.
55 Peter Dominiczak, Labour Would Scrap Tax Break for Married Couples, says Ed
Balls, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10696553/
Labour-would-scrap-tax-break-for-married-couples-says-Ed-Balls.html.
56 See Laura Suter, Are you due £432 for the marriage tax allowance?, THE TELEGRAPH
(Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/consumer-affairs/due-432-marriage-tax-al-
lowance/.
57 Norton Francis, et al., TPC Briefing Book; What other countries use return-free fil-
ing?, TAx POLICY CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-other-coun-
tries-use-return-free-filing.
58 See Suter, supra note 56.
AN ExPREsSIVE THEORY OF TAX
actively for up to four years,5 9 with little expected effect on the past
marital decisions of recipients.
2. The Family that Pays Together
The United Kingdom is fairly typical in levying income taxes at the
individual level-in 2013, nineteen members of the Organization for Ec-
onomic Co-operation and Development had individual-level income tax-
ation for spouses, and eleven taxed spouses jointly in some way.60
The United States is among those latter countries, taxing married
couples jointly under almost all circumstances. 6 1 While the U.S. Federal
income tax was originally levied on individuals as well, joint filing was
introduced in 1948 in response to the effect of varying state property
laws on the ability of married couples to split their income.62
In Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the Persistence of the
Marital Unit in the American Income Tax,63 Marjorie Kornhauser argues
that the persistence of joint filing in the U.S. is fundamentally expres-
sive-motivated by cultural preferences for marriage and religion (which
supports marriage) and the desire of Congress to express these values in
the tax code. She begins with a historical analysis, outlining the unique,
central role that marriage and religion have played in the civic life of
America since its founding-countries with less cultural attachment to
the institution of marriage (or where religious institutions occupy a less
59 Paul Hacket, Why the married tax allowance has been an 'utter flop,' THE WEEK (Feb.
18, 2016), http://www.theweek.co.uk/69731/why-the-married-tax-allowance-has-been-an-ut-
ter-flop,
60 See PFl.4: Neutrality of tax-benefit systems, OECD Family Database, SOCIAL POLICY
DrvIsION-DIRECORATE OF EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRs (updated 2016),
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PFl_4_Neutralityofjtaxbenefit-systems.pdf.
61 There is an option on the federal income tax return to file as "married filing sepa-
rately" but it is a highly disfavored filing status that is almost never financially preferable to
filing jointly but can serve an important purpose in cases where non-tax considerations weigh
against spousal collaboration.
62 For a complete discussion of the advent of joint filing and the historical evolution of
the rate structure see Edward Mccaffery, TAXING WOMEN 79-81 (1997). The rise of commu-
nity property laws in the 1920's and 1930's created a strange inequality in the tax system:
under Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 (1930), wealthy single-earner couples in community
property states were allowed to attribute half the husband's income to the wife for the purposes
of federal taxes (thus being taxed at a substantially lower rate, due to the progressivity of the
rate structure), while similarly situated couples in non-community property jurisdictions were
unable to engage in income-splitting. As more states adopted community property laws-
partially in response to Seaborn, which drove a number of states to grant women the barest
property rights necessary to allow their wealthy husbands favorable federal tax treatment-
Congress (especially members from non-community property jurisdictions) became increas-
ingly concerned about the inequality and loss of revenue created by this patchwork system. A
move to joint filing in 1948 solved the problem, but created problems of its own, as we will
see.
63 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the Persistence of
the Marital Unit in the American Income Tax, 11 THEORILAW 631, 651 (2010).
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contested space in the public discourse) will not find it necessary to ex-
press governmental support for marriage in the tax code-then turns to
U.S. tax law. Speaking of the joint return, Kornhauser says, "As its name
indicates, it strikes at the heart of marriage-its unity, its sharing. Con-
gressional action in this area, therefore, is an effective means of showing
symbolic support for marriage, families, and religion, which in turn sup-
ports marriage and families."" By establishing married couples as the
unit of taxation, the government supports the monetary, cultural and spir-
itual unity that marriage entails. The joint filing unit provides the kind of
visible "recognition" of marriage that the Tories sought in the U.K. and,
as discussed in the next section, provides a reward to the type of families
most valued by American culture: the breadwinning husband married to
a stay-at-home mother. This family benefits mightily from the lower tax
rates garnered by splitting the husband's sole income between the two
spouses for tax purposes, and Kornhauser argues convincingly that this
"traditional" family's cultural importance has been a driving factor in the
maintenance of joint filing in the U.S. 6 566
Moving to joint filing does not end the debate over marriage and
taxes-in fact, it creates a new set of difficult tax policy questions. Over
the past three decades, the problem of so-called "marriage penalties" in
the tax code has been a recurrent focus of debate in the United States.
3. Marriage Penalties and Second Earner Biases
When taxing married couples in a progressive system, there is a
tension between neutrality across married couples with similar total in-
comes and neutrality with regard to marital state (individual, married
couple, cohabiting couple, etc.). This is an unavoidable consequence of
6 Id. at 651.
65 See also Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender
Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 292-94 (1988). Jones additionally argues that
legislators were motivated by explicit desire to curtail the state-level shift to community prop-
erty (and thus the advance of women's economic rights) by eliminating the tax benefit ac-
corded to wealthy married men in community property states. But see Lawrence Zelenak,
Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 347 (1994) and Lawrence Zelenak,
Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1521, 1574 (1998).
66 There is a reasonable equity argument for joint filing-when judging ability to pay,
some kind of income splitting can certainly be justifiable. The economic benefits and burdens
of sharing expenses and providing for a spouse can certainly make a married household better
or worse off than another household with similar income. But see Lily Kahng, The Not So
Merry Wives of Windsor, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 325, 368-369 (2015) (critique of the "fiction"
of marital unity (regardless of wives' actual legal claim to "joint" income) especially in the
historical era in which the joint return emerged) and Zelenak, supra note 1. I do not intend to
argue that there is no explanation for joint filing outside of an expressive explanation; rather,
that attention to social meaning can help us understand why the American system has devel-
oped differently than the British system, why this difference persists, and how to best attack
some of the problems created by joint filing while still expressing appropriate reverence for
ideals cherished by the American people.
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progressive rates, and it creates an important set of choices that policy-
makers must grapple with-choices that implicate different contested
cultural values around family structure and gender roles in the home.67
Individual filing is marriage neutral. Each member of a couple pays
tax on his or her own income, without regard to whether the couple is
married, cohabiting, or just getting to know each other. Each member of
the couple pays the same as he or she would as a single individual. Indi-
vidual filing does not, however, tax all married couples with the same
total income at the same rate.
Joint filing, on the other hand, can tax all couples with similar in-
comes at the same rate, but introduces marriage "penalties" or "bonuses,"
into the system-couples will pay more or less after marriage than they
would if they paid as individuals. In theory, this tax non-neutrality could
affect decisions about when and whether to marry.
a. The Mechanics of "Marriage Penalties"
Individual filing is marriage neutral, with individual taxpayers taxed
the same whether they are married or single. Imagine a simple, progres-
sive income tax, in which all income up to $20,000 is taxed at a 10
percent rate, and all income above $20,000 is taxed at a 20 percent rate.
An individual making $40,000 will pay $20,000 x 10% + $20,000 x 20%
= $2,000 + $4,000 = $6,000 in taxes, for an average effective rate of 15
percent. The combined tax on two individuals making $40,000 each is
$12,000, and the average effective rate for the two together is 15 percent.
In an individual filing system, this is true whether these two are married
or perfect strangers. Individual filing is marriage-neutral. But because of
this, it treats couples differently depending on the distribution of earnings
between them.
Consider a single-breadwinner couple earning $80,000 (the same to-
tal income as the egalitarian couple above). Under an individual-filing
regime, the non-earning spouse will pay zero taxes on zero income. The
breadwinner will pay $20,000 x 10% + $60,000 x 20% = $14,000 for an
average effective tax rate of 17.5 percent. This couple has the same net
income as our egalitarian couple, and the same number of people in the
household sharing the income, yet they pay $2,000 more in taxes (an
extra 2.5 percent of income). A single-breadwinner couple is taxed more
than a dual-earner couple because of the progressive rate structure-each
individual member of the egalitarian couple is, in the eyes of the tax
code, less well-off than the husband in the traditional family, and thus
67 For a detailed explanation of the policy puzzles surrounding taxation of married
couples and the feminist implications of different approaches, see Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy
and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001 (1996);
See also Zelenak, supra note 1.
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taxed at a lower rate, even as both couples have the same combined mar-
ket income.
By contrast, joint filing taxes couples with the same income at the
same rate, without regard to who earns what within the marriage, but is
not neutral across marital states. Imagine the same two couples, facing
the same rate structure, but in a joint-filing regime. Under this system,
an individual making $40,000 per year will still pay $6,000 (15 percent)
in taxes, and two unmarried individuals each making $40,000 per year
will still pay a combined $12,000 (15 percent) in taxes. But, if those two
get married, they will have a combined income of $80,000 and their tax
bill will equal $20,000 x 10% + $60,000 x 20% = $2,000 + $12,000 =
$14,000 (17.5%). This is a marriage penalty. The couple pays more
after marriage than they would as individuals.
What about our single breadwinner couple, in which one spouse
earns nothing and the other spouse earns $80,000? They pay the same
$14,000 (17.5 percent) as the egalitarian married couple-joint filing is
neutral as between married couples with the same income. They also
pay the same as if they were not married-because the tax brackets are
exactly the same for married couples and individuals, our breadwinner
pays the same as half of a married couple as he would as an individual.
Single breadwinner couples pay no marriage penalty in this scenario.
Now imagine a joint filing regime in which the income cutoff for
the higher tax bracket is doubled for married couples, to reflect the fact
that two individuals are contributing to and being supported by the
pooled family income. Married couples now pay 10 percent on their first
$40,000 of combined income and 20 percent on the rest. Our individuals
still pay $6,000 each and $12,000 combined (15 percent). And now both
our egalitarian couple and our single-breadwinner couple also pay
$12,000 (15 percent). 68
Marriage neutrality has been restored-but only for the egalitarian
couple. The single breadwinner couple pays the same $12,000 (15 per-
cent) in taxes as the egalitarian couple, but this is less than the $14,000
(17.5 percent) the single breadwinner would have paid as an unmarried
individual. Now our single-breadwinner couple is receiving a marriage
bonus. In fact, any couple with a disparity in income that puts them in
different individual tax brackets gets this "marriage bonus" because
some portion of the high-earning spouse's income is taxed at a lower rate
than it would be under the individual schedule.
These two rate schedules (one schedule for all or doubled for mar-
ried couples) represent the poles-anything in between creates a mix of
marriage penalties, bonuses and neutrality for different couples with dif-
68 $40,000 x 10% + $40,000 x 15%.
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ferent individual earnings. This is an inherent tradeoff when thinking
about taxing couples-it is impossible to choose a regime that is both
marriage-neutral (treating individuals the same whether they are part of a
married couple or not) and neutral as between married couples with the
same income. Once you have decided to prioritize neutrality across mar-
ried couples, your only choice is whether to subsidize marriage (and pe-
nalize single people), tax marriage, or a little bit of each. When
originally enacted in 1948, the U.S. joint filing system went all-in on
subsidizing marriage, eliminating all bracket-related marriage penalties
and providing substantial marriage bonuses by doubling the single-indi-
vidual brackets for married couples, 69 but in 1969 Congress adopted an
intermediate approach, reintroducing marriage penalties for many
couples and setting the stage for future battles over marriage and the tax
code.
b. Another Hitch: Secondary-Earner Biases
Another crucial effect of joint filing is that it creates what is known
as the secondary-earner bias. Consider our single-breadwinner family
again, and imagine that the non-earning spouse wishes to enter the labor
force. Under an individual filing regime, the first dollar of the new
worker's salary will be taxed at the 10 percent rate. Under a joint-filing
regime, the new worker's first dollar will be treated as dollar 80,001 for
the tax unit, and taxed at the 20 percent rate. Thus, the secondary earner
faces a higher effective marginal tax on his labor than he would under
individual filing, even if on net his family receives a marriage bonus.
While there is nothing about the tax code that dictates whose income is
"taxed first" at the lower rate and who's income is "stacked on top" and
taxed at the higher rate, most couples view the substantially lower-earn-
ing spouse's income as marginal, and thus treat it as though it is taxed
fully at the highest rate.7 0 This increased marginal tax rate can distort the
labor-market decisions of the low-earning spouse, especially when the
second earner already faces high costs to income production (childcare
costs, for example, which may only exist if both spouses are working).
69 Recall that this approach protects all married couples from a marriage "penalty" but
only provides a bonus for couples with unequal incomes, with the largest bonuses going to
single-breadwinner couples.
70 In dual-breadwinner heterosexual married couples in the U.S. the secondary earner is
generally the wife, though this has been changing over time. See WENDY WANG, Kim PARKER
AND PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BREADWINNER MOMs, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/05/29/chapter-3-married-mothers-who-out-earn-
their-husbands/. ("Among married couples with children, the proportion in which the wife's
income tops her husband's has increased from about 4% in 1960 to 23% in 2011. By contrast,
the share of couples in which the husband makes more than his wife has fallen about 20
percentage points, from 95% in 1960 to 75% in 2011.").
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This distortion is an obvious target for tax policy reform driven by effi-
ciency concerns.71
These two distinct but intertwined side-effects of joint filing-mar-
riage penalties/bonuses and the secondary earner bias-offer a chance to
explore the expressive component of our society's choices about how we
tax families. They are both created by the same system, but marriage
penalties and secondary-earner biases have vastly different cultural va-
lences. Some legislative solutions (including abolition of joint filing) ad-
dress both issues, some address only one, and each proposal has its own
unique distributional effect as between couples with different divisions
of earnings. Attention to the expressive value of each potential legislative
choice can help us understand why certain paths and sets of arguments
are favored over others.
c. Puzzling Policy Choices
Beginning in the 1980s, relief from the marriage penalty became an
important component of the Republican tax program, with rhetoric fo-
cused on the centrality of marriage, motherhood and homemaking to
American culture. By the year 2000, it would be central to presidential
candidate George W. Bush's tax-cutting plan, and by 2001 Congress
would enact targeted marriage penalty relief as part of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act. Before delving into the spe-
cific policy choices embodied in these Republican-led marriage penalty
relief plans, it is worth discussing the empirical incidence of marriage
penalties and bonuses at the time of the debate.
1. Who Pays the Price?
In the 1990s, as marriage penalty relief was put front and center by
the conservative Contract for America, the majority-51 percent-of
married tax filing units received a marriage bonus, while 42 percent paid
a marriage penalty and 6 percent were unaffected by their marital status.
At $1,400 per couple, average marriage bonuses were slightly higher
than marriage penalties, which averaged $1,300 per couple, resulting in a
total net revenue loss to marriage bonuses of $4 billion per year.72 It is
also worth noting that under 1996 law, higher-income married couples
were more likely than lower-income couples to pay a marriage penalty,73
71 The larger disincentive is the nontaxation of imputed income from household produc-
tion, but taxing women for providing childcare and cooking meals is a total non-starter. See
Alstott, supra note 67 for a full discussion of conflicting feminist perspectives on the non-
taxation of imputed income.
72 Congressional Budget Office, For Better or worse: Marriage and the Federal Income
Tax, 29-30 (1997), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/
marriage.pdf.
73 Id. at 31, table 5.
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though lower-middle-income couples paid the highest net penalty (due to
filing status effects and the EITC) both in total tax dollars and as a share
of income.74
Across the income spectrum, the largest marriage penalties were, of
course, paid by couples with the most egalitarian division of earnings.
Forty-four percent of joint-filing couples had only a single earner, and 89
percent of these single-breadwinner couples received a marriage bonus
(the rest were unaffected, and none paid a marriage penalty). In 24 per-
cent of couples each spouse contributed at least one third of the house-
hold's income, and among these families, 90 percent paid a marriage
penalty, and only five percent received a marriage bonus. Most couples
facing a marriage penalty fell into this most-egalitarian quarter of the
married population.7 5
But these families were not the focus of marriage penalty relief. If
they were, a return to individual filing or a second-earner credit that re-
dressed the imbalance between egalitarian couples and "traditional"
couples would have been the policy levers of choice, as they are well-
targeted to couples who actually face a marriage penalty, and have the
bonus effect of reducing or eliminating the second-earner bias. Instead,
the marriage penalty relief called for in the Contract for America and
eventually enacted into law under George W. Bush76 took the form of a
partial return to the doubled tax brackets of the original 1948 plan.
These bracket expansions are the most expensive version of mar-
riage penalty relief (providing an enhanced marriage bonus to "tradi-
tional" couples), are poorly targeted from a distributional standpoint, and
provide very little marginal relief from the second-eamer bias.
All of this could still be consistent with traditional tax policy analy-
sis if Congress wants to incentivize marriage as a matter of social policy
and does not care about (or actively opposes) correcting disincentives to
women's/mother's market work. Lawrence Zelenak reviews the evidence
and puts a fine point on the problem with this theory:
. . .the proponents [of doubled brackets for married
couples] do not adequately explain what the subsidy is
supposed to accomplish. No one is so bold as to claim
that the point is simply to throw billions of dollars at
people whose lifestyle merits approval, but who would
engage in the same behavior without the cash. The pur-
pose, then, must be to change behavior, but in what
way? If it is supposed to encourage couples to marry
74 Id. at 32, table 6.
75 Id at 33, table 7.
76 GEORGE W. BusH, A CHARGE To KEEP, 238 (2001) ("I support reducing the marriage
penalty because the tax code should not conflict with our core values.").
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rather than cohabit, the problem is the evidence that tax
rules have little effect on those decisions. The likely re-
sult is billions of dollars of revenue loss with almost no
resulting change in marriage rates. The Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that the additional
marriages created by a return to 1948 would come at a
revenue cost of about $380,000 per couple.77
Zelenak spends several pages digging into the policy problems discussed
above, and a host of other distributional, equity and efficiency problems
with using doubled brackets for married couples as a subsidy for mar-
riage, concluding that, "the distribution of the subsidies from income
splitting simply cannot be explained on any rational policy ground."78
d. Motives May Be Mixed, But Expressive Concerns
Dominate
His policy analysis is extremely careful, but Zelenak makes one
mistaken leap of logic. Because he does not recognize the importance of
the expressive component of taxation, he is puzzled by the expenditure of
vast sums of money on an incentive that does not appear to actually af-
fect behavior. Let me be bold: the point of the policy is simply to throw
billions of dollars at people whose lifestyle merits approval. That is the
"true purpose," and changing behavior is a beneficial, but not terribly
important, side-effect.
Recall that in the debate over brothel taxes in Nevada expressive
concerns are easy to separate from instrumental goals because the two
are in direct conflict. The payment of taxes is seen as conferring "legiti-
macy," and legislators are so concerned with this expressive effect that
they are willing to forgo revenue and even provide tax preferences for
the disfavored behavior to avoid sending what they see as the wrong
message. In most other settings, however, expressive concerns overlap
with other concerns, often in ways that have led tax scholars to miss the
expressive dimension altogether. When it comes to marriage, and most
other tax debates, tax preferences are seen as conveying cultural support
and value. This complicates expressive analysis, as tax preferences serve
both to express cultural value and to provide actual material incentives.
The U.K. marriage tax debate has recently been marked by similar frank-
ness-with direct appeals to the "message" sent by the "recognition" of
marriage in the tax code. America's debate over marriage penalties is
somewhat harder to parse. We rarely hear such explicit admissions from
politicians that they are purely interested in sending a message.
77 Zelenak, supra note 1, at 31.
78 Id. at 32.
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Nonetheless, given that there is very little evidence that com-
pressing or expanding the size of the married-filing-jointly brackets has
any effect on marriage rates, and given that there are less-costly and bet-
ter-targeted ways to attack this marriage disincentive if it does exist, it
seems clear that "rewarding marriage" means something more than sim-
ply creating an effective incentive. Yet again, it is not the money, it's the
message, and while American politicians are not quite as upfront about it
as David Cameron, political rhetoric about family taxation is full of ref-
erences to the importance of supporting marriage, from political actors
who, if pressed, would admit that taxes are rarely the main driver of
marital decisionmaking. Take, for example, the debate surrounding the
2001 tax bill. During House debate, a Democratic supporter of the bill,
Representative James Barcia (D-Michigan) described marriage penalty
relief in this way:
"[F]undamentally the marriage penalty is an issue of tax
fairness. Married couples on average pay $1,400 more in
taxes simply because they are married. This is an unfair
burden on our Nation's married couples. Marriage is a
sacred institution and our Tax Code should not discour-
age it by making married couples pay more. We need to
change the Tax Code so it no longer discriminates
against those who are wed. . .The legislation that is
before us will fix the grave injustice of our current Tax
Code that results in married couples paying higher taxes
than they would if they remained singles. . . This bill
strikes to the heart of middle-income tax relief. These
are the people who are the backbone of our communi-
ties. These are the people who need tax relief the most.7 9
To Rep. Barcia, marriage penalty relief was about "fairness," and
stopping "discrimination" against the "sacred institution" of marriage,
and the "people who are the backbone of our communities" and thus
"need tax relief the most." In testimony he submitted to the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, he was even more explicitly expressive:
"Congressman Weller once said that the only form someone can file to
avoid the marriage tax penalty is the paperwork for divorce. That's not
the message that Congress should send to working families across our
nation."8 0 Congressman Tom Cole (R-OK) echoed this sentiment in the
2004 debate over continued marriage penalty relief, stating in a press
79 146 Cong. Rec. H4961 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 2001 to Apr. 23, 2001) (statement of Rep.
Barcia).
80 Hearing on President's Tax Relief Proposals that Affect Indiividuals Before the H.
Comm. On Ways and Means, 2001 (statement of Rep. Barcia), Mar. 21, 2001, https://waysand
means.house.gov/Legacy/fullcommn/107cong/3-21-01/3-21barc.htm.
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release: "Married couples should not suffer an unfair tax disadvantage
simply because they are married. The government is sending the wrong
message to families by making them pay more in taxes then [sic] they
would if they were single."81 A recent paper on marriage penalties in the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program by the conservative Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute argues that, "Although it is unclear how much the
EITC factors into decisions about marriage, marriage penalties send the
wrong message and might contribute to a culture that minimizes the im-
portance of marriage." 82
Once we recognize that policymakers value the expressive content
of a tax subsidy for marriage (and particularly for "traditional" marriages
reflecting conservative gender roles and family values) independent of
the subsidy's instrumental effects on marriage rates, differing social
meaning can explain policy choices that are inexplicable on traditional
grounds.83
An individual filing regime would eliminate both the marriage pen-
alty and the second-earner bias, but, for the reasons cited by Korn-
hauser 84 (and David Cameron), a shift to individual filing would have
undesirable expressive consequences-destroying the tax code's recog-
nition of marriage as our culture's primary organizational unit-and is
thus unsatisfactory. It would make the tax code marriage-neutral, rather
than "supportive" of marriage, which is not what the American public
and its elected officials desire.
Similarly, credits for second earners or other policies targeted di-
rectly at dual-earner couples could simultaneously eliminate or reduce
the marriage penalty (or even provide a marriage subsidy if that is the
goal) and partially correct the disincentive to market work created by the
current code. Yet secondary earner credits did not gain traction as "mar-
riage penalty relief' became a rallying cry in election after election, and
was then cemented as a core part of the popular "middle-class tax cuts"
portion of George W. Bush's 2001 and 2003 policies.
This seems odd from an efficiency standpoint, but makes perfect
sense given the vastly different social meanings conveyed by, on the one
hand, rewarding marriage and, on the other, supporting married women
who work outside the home. In contemporary American society, mar-
81 Press Release, Congressman Tom Cole, Congressman Cole Votes for Marriage Pen-
alty Tax Relief (Apr. 28, 2004), https://cole.house.gov/press-release/congressman-cole-votes-
marriage-penalty-tax-relief.
82 Angela Rachidi, The earned income tax credit and marriage penalties: Does a child-
less worker expansion make them worse? (Nov. 2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/The-earned-income-tax-credit-and-marriage-penalties.pdf.
83 For further discussion of the use of "incentive" language in expressive debates, see
Secret Ambition of Incentive, supra note 17.
84 Kornhauser, supra note 63.
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riage is an ideal with broad support, while working motherhood is much
more contested. According to a 2007 Pew Research Center survey, fully
41 percent of Americans view the trend toward mothers of young chil-
dren working as "a bad thing for our society," 32 percent view the trend
neutrally, and only 20 percent view it as a positive trend for society 8 5-
this in spite of the fact that a large majority of women with young chil-
dren now work outside the home.86 By contrast, seven in ten respondents
said that it was either very important (47 percent) or somewhat important
(23 percent) to them that a man and a woman get legally married if they
intend to spend the rest of their lives together.
In fact, during debate over the 2001 marriage penalty relief, in a
column entitled The Hidden Meaning of Marriage Tax Repeal, influen-
tial, anti-feminist conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly 7 weighed in,8 8
asking, "Is the purpose of cutting the marriage tax to accord long over-
due socio-economic respect for marriage as an institution fundamental to
our society and to the raising of children? Or is the purpose to enable
government to engage in national economic planning by using tax policy
to influence human behavior?" 8 9 As her tone implies, for Schlafly, the
marriage penalty relief targeted at dual-earner couples offered in the
President's budget (a reintroduction of a "10 percent deduction for two-
earner couples" 90) was unacceptable, as this policy would "send the radi-
cal feminist message that the government sees no value in a home-
maker's work at home." 91 Schlafly could not have been clearer: "Few
people understand how the marriage tax functions or how it should be
remedied except the green-eyeshade number-crunchers. But dollars are
not all that matters; ideology is at stake in the drafting of changes in the
income tax law." 9 2
85 Paul Taylor, Cary Funk and April Clark, As Marriage and Parenthood Drift Apart,
Public Is Concerned about Social Impact, PEw SocIL TRENDS (July 1, 2007), http://www
.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2007/07/Pew-Marriage-report-6-28-for-web-display.pdf
86 U.S. Census Bureau, The Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012 (131st Edi-
tion), at table 599, http://www.census.gov/compendialstatab/.
87 Upon her death in 2016, Schlafly was described by the Washington Post as, "a con-
servative activist, lawyer and author who is credited with almost single-handedly stopping the
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s and who helped move the Republican
Party toward the right on family and religious issues" and "[a] champion of traditional, stay-at-
home roles for women, [who] opposed the ERA because she believed it would open the door
to same-sex marriage, abortion, the military draft for women, co-ed bathrooms and the end of
labor laws that barred women from dangerous workplaces." Patricia Sullivan, Phyllis Schlafly,
a conservative activist, has died at age 92, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2016.
88 Schlafly, supra note 2.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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The failure of bracket expansions to target working mothers and
egalitarian couples is not a defect in the American milieu-it is a posi-
tive feature if one is concerned not only with efficiency, equity, or incen-
tivizing marriage, but also with expressing cultural admiration of
"traditional" families. And once we view this as the primary goal of
marriage penalty relief, policies that explicitly express support for mar-
ried women are less appealing than policies that simply "support mar-
riage." It is the broad-based expressive resonance of "rewarding
marriage" that allows marriage penalty relief to take hold while efforts to
explicitly help working women fall flat.
C. Deductions Denied
1. Tax Exempt, "Government Approved" Racial Discrimination
Legislators are not the only ones concerned about the expressive
power of tax law. Judges have also placed explicit value on the expres-
sive power of the code-and nowhere as clearly as at the intersection
between the tax code and constitutional and statutory bars on racial
discrimination.
In McGlotten v. Connally,93 an African American plaintiff chal-
lenged the granting of various tax benefits to the Benevolent and Protec-
tive Order of the Elks. Mr. McGlotten alleged that he had been denied
membership in the organization because of his race, and sued to enjoin
the Treasury Secretary from granting any of the following benefits to
organizations with racially discriminatory policies and practices: (1) tax-
exempt status as nonprofit clubs under IRC § 501(c) (7); (2) tax-exempt
status as fraternal orders under IRC § 501(c) (8); and (3) tax deductibility
of contributions to the organization.
The suit challenged these tax benefits on three theories: (1) the
granting of the benefits is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the perpetuation of racial discrimina-
tion by fraternal orders is an impermissible use of funds that violates the
statutory requirement under IRC §§ 170(c) (4), 642(c), 2055, 2106(a),
and 2522 that tax-deductible contributions be used "exclusively for relig-
ious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals.;" and (3) that the granting of
the enumerated tax benefits violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964's bar
on discrimination by any "program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 94
93 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
94 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
AN ExPREsSIVE THEORY OF TAX
As it tackles each of these claims, the McGlotten court repeatedly
finds itself appealing explicitly to the expressive function of exemption
from taxation. But perhaps its clearest appeal to the expressive function
of law resides in its analysis of the plaintiffs standing to sue.
a. Injurious Endorsements
To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing,95 the plaintiff
alleged two injuries: "First, that the funds generated by such tax benefits
enable segregated fraternal orders to maintain their racist membership
policies; and second, that such benefits constitute an endorsement of bla-
tantly discriminatory organizations by the Federal Government."96 The
court finds that both of these two alleged injurieS97-enabling the main-
tenance of racist policies on the part of fraternal orders, and simply en-
dorsing these discriminatory organizations-constitute injuries in fact for
the purposes of standing.98 The first alleged injury, that the tax benefits
"enable" racism, can be seen as an instrumental harm, but the second
injury is fundamentally expressive: by granting the challenged tax prefer-
ences, the federal government "endorses" discriminatory organizations,
inappropriately expressing approval for discrimination, and this expres-
sion alone injures the victims of the governmentally-endorsed
discrimination.
This analysis carries over into the court's treatment of the substan-
tive claims raised by the plaintiff.
b. When the Code Speaks, the Government Acts
In ruling that the deductibility of contributions to discriminatory fra-
ternal orders violates the Constitution, the court finds that, through the
allowance of these deductions, "the Government has become sufficiently
entwined with private parties to call forth a duty to ensure compliance
95 "The Supreme Court has recently clarified this troubled area, setting forth a two-part
test for standing: 1) for purposes of the case or controversy requirement of Article III it must
appear 'that the challenged action has caused injury in fact, economic or otherwise;' and 2) as
a matter of judicial self-restraint, the court must determine 'whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'" McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 452
(quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)).
96 Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
97 "We find both these allegations of injury sufficient to ensure that 'the dispute sought
to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution.'" Id. (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., 397 U.S.
150 (1970)) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968)).
98 Just as "[a] person or family may have a spiritual stake in First Amendment values
sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause and Free Exer-
cise Clause," so a black American has standing to challenge a system of federal support and
encouragement of segregated fraternal organizations. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.,
397 U.S. at 153.
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with the Fifth Amendment by the parties through whom it chooses to
act,"99 distinguishing this deduction from the "general run" of ordinary
deductions from income which do not transform private activity into
state action.100 It supports this finding in a number of ways-support for
"charitable" activities represents a delegation of governmental functions
to private actors,101 the extensive regulation of exempt organizations
under the code causes the government to retain substantial control over
the organizations in questionl 2-but each argument is suffused with ap-
peals to the expressive power of the tax regime. By specifying which
organizations can receive deductible contributions, and issuing letters of
determination to qualifying organizations, "the government has marked
certain organizations as 'Government Approved' with the result that such
organizations may solicit funds from the general public on the basis of
that approval."103 By granting the deduction, "the Government has
'place[d] its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimi-
nation.""04 These deductions are distinguishable from others in part by
"the aura of Government approval inherent in an exempt ruling by the
Internal Revenue Service. . ."1o and the fact that they "allow such orga-
nizations to represent themselves as having the imprimatur of the Gov-
ernment."106 The contours of state action are in some part defined by the
pure expression of approval conveyed by the deduction.
In the preceding section, expressive concerns were consistently cou-
pled with more instrumental concerns, making it difficult to determine
whether the court found pure expression of approval to be sufficient state
action to implicate the Fifth Amendment-not so in the court's analysis
of tax exemption for the income of discriminatory nonprofit clubs and
99 McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 456-57.
100 "Every deduction in the tax laws provides a benefit to the class who may take advan-
tage of it. And the withdrawal of that benefit would often act as a substantial incentive to
eliminate the behavior which caused the change in status. Yet the provision of an income tax
deduction for mortgage interest paid has not been held sufficient to make the Federal Govern-
ment a 'joint participant' in the bigotry practiced by a homeowner. . ." Id. (citing Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
101 "The rationale for allowing the deduction of charitable contributions has historically
been that by doing so, the Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs
which in the absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the Government.
'The Government is compensated for its loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds."' Id. (quoting H.
Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 19 (1938)).
102 "The statute, regulations, and administrative rulings thereunder, define in extensive
detail not only the purposes which will satisfy the statute, but the vehicles through which those
purposes may be achieved as well." Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. (emphasis added).
105 Id. at 457.
106 Id.
AN ExPREssIvE THEORY OF TAX
fraternal orders. In fact, the Court appears to find the expressive content
of the law's treatment of the two types of organizations critical.
First, the court determines that the non-taxation of "exempt function
income" 107 earned by nonprofit clubs "does not operate to provide a
grant of federal funds through the tax system. Rather, it is part and parcel
of defining appropriate subjects of taxation."108 While the distinction be-
tween the exemption here and the deductibility of contributions is debat-
able,'0 the court finds no "grant" of federal funds to create a state action,
but then moves on to expressive analysis: "That the Government pro-
vides no monetary benefit does not, however, insulate its involvement
from constitutional scrutiny . . . Encouragement of discrimination
through the appearance of governmental approval may also be sufficient
involvement to violate the Constitution."'"0 The court then evaluates the
expressive value of corporate income tax exemptions granted to non-
profit clubs and fraternal orders in turn, finding that, due to the different
structures of the exemptions, "there is no mark of Government approval
inherent in the designation of a [nonprofit club] as exempt""' under
§ 501(c) (7), and thus the exemption for discriminatory nonprofit clubs
passes constitutional muster, whereas the exemption granted to fraternal
orders organized under § 501(c) (8) fails because, "[b]y providing differ-
ential treatment to only selected organizations, the Government has indi-
cated approval of the organizations and hence their discriminatory
practice, and aided that discrimination by the provision of federal tax
benefits."11 2 One need not agree with the distinction drawn by the Court
between the two types of exemption"i3 to see the importance of the law's
expressive content to the Court's rulings.
c. When Approval Means Assistance
The court then addresses the plaintiffs claim that the targeted tax
benefits represent "Federal financial assistance" for the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which proscribes, among other things, racial
107 I.R.C. § 512(a)(3)(A) (1988).
108 McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 458.
109 See Boris I. Bittker and Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitution-
alizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972) (For a critical treatment of the
McGlotten Court's reasoning on this point and others.).
110 McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 458.
Il1 Id.
112 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
113 See Bittker and Kaufman, supra note 109, at 68-74, for a persuasive argument that the
distinction drawn by the court between the "particularized" allowance embodied in exemption
for fraternal orders and the "across the board" allowance embodied by the exemption for non-
profit clubs is "ambiguous and unsatisfactory," and lacks the ability to distinguish many other
allowances in the code from one another.
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discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."1 1 4
After finding that the "plain purpose of the statute" indicates that
assistance provided through the tax code is "within the scope of Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,"' 15 the court must articulate a limiting prin-
cipal, lest every deduction or exemption-or other failure to tax-in the
code be deemed "assistance." The deductibility of contributions to dis-
criminatory organizations is dealt with quickly, with reference to tax ex-
penditure analysis, deeming the charitable deduction "a special tax
provision not required by, and contrary to, widely accepted definitions of
income applicable to the determination of the structure of an income
tax. "116
As to the tax exemptions granted to the organizations themselves,
the court simply recapitulates its state action analysis, repeating that the
exemption for nonprofit clubs does not operate as a grant because of its
"across-the-board" nature, explicable "as a matter of pure tax policy," 117
whereas, "[s]ince it is available only to particular groups, [the exemption
for fraternal organizations] operates in fact as a subsidy in favor of the
particular activities these groups are pursuing."118
2. Illicit Business and the Frustration of Public Policy
While the McGlotten decision is unusual in both its finding that tax
exemption represents state action for the purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment, and its explicit appeals to the expressive content of the tax code, its
reasoning may shed light on other disallowed deductions and exemptions
that are otherwise confusing.
The courts established early on that the federal income tax was to
apply equally to income derived from legal and illegal enterprises. 119
The courts also generally affirmed that the taxation of net income pre-
114 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
115 "In the absence of strong legislative history to the contrary, the plain purpose of the
statute is controlling. Here that purpose is clearly to eliminate discrimination in programs or
activities benefitting from federal financial assistance. Distinctions as to the method of distri-
bution of federal funds or their equivalent seem beside the point, as the regulations issued by
the various agencies make apparent." McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 461.
116 Id. at 462 (quoting S.S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reforms: The Varied Approaches
Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 352, 384 (1970)).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., US v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) (upholding the taxation of profits
from bootlegging).
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scribed by the code required that illegal enterprises be allowed to deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses like any other business.1 2 0
Yet the deduction of expenses incurred in illicit business caused
judges significant discomfort over the years. Over the first 50 years of
the tax code, courts routinely disallowed deductions for otherwise ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses incurred in the process of ob-
taining illicit income, on the grounds that allowing such deductions
would "frustrate public policy." 12 1 These disallowed deductions included
fines and penalties, lobbying and "propaganda" on behalf of German
"enemy aliens" after the Second World War,1 22 and bribes, among other
things-and many of these disallowances were then codified by Con-
gress.1 23 While the courts in the above cases did not dispute the relation-
ship of the claimed expenses to income-generating enterprises, they
seemed to find it unfathomable that Congress could have intended to
allow deductions for such activities. In a canonical case, Tank Truck
Rentals v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court announced, "We will not
presume that the Congress, in allowing deductions for income tax pur-
poses, intended to encourage a business enterprise to violate the declared
policy of a State," and declared state fines paid by a trucking company
for running overweight trucks through Pennsylvania non-deductible.1 24
But what does it mean for a tax deduction to "frustrate" public pol-
icy, or to "encourage" violation of state policy? In Suitable for Framing:
Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, David I. Walker ar-
gues convincingly that the determination that allowing certain deductions
would frustrate public policy (and their subsequent disallowance in the
code) is frequently based in the (often erroneous) mental framing of a
deduction as a subsidy, even when the deduction is necessary to define a
business's net income. 1 2 5
120 See, e.g., Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (The Supreme Court noted that the issue
had been clearly addressed at the time of the code's initial enactment, when the Senate voted
down several amendments that would have limited deductibility of business expenses to those
expenses incurred in the operation of lawful businesses. The Tellier Court quoted the Senate
floor manager of the bill: "The object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say,
what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses.
It is not to reform men's moral characters; that is not the object of the bill at all. ").
121 See Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) (discussing judicial
disallowance).
122 See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326, 336 (1941).
123 I.R.C. §§ 162(c), (e)-(f) (2014).
124 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
125 David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income Tax
System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1255, 1262-63, 1272 (2011) ("Despite the fact that
our income tax is based on net, not gross income, I believe that in thinking about any particular
business deduction observers tend to adopt a pre-deduction, gross income baseline. Given that
baseline, these deductions appear to be pro-taxpayer deviations that we tend to conceptualize
as subsidies. This is not surprising. Outside of the tax context, to "deduct" means to reduce,
subtract, or discount from some baseline. The elimination of a deduction is a move back in the
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According to Professor Walker, the implicit baseline adopted by a
court, and whether a deduction is a deviation from that baseline-and
thus a subsidy-or simply necessary to accurately measure net income, is
often dispositive as to whether the deduction is found to frustrate public
policy. 126
He illustrates this point by comparing Tank Trunk1 27 to another
well-known case handed down on the same day: Commissioner v. Sulli-
van.128 When read together, these cases are extremely puzzling. Each
assesses a business deduction related to illicit behavior and whether al-
lowing such a deduction would frustrate public policy, but the rules out-
lined in the two cases are difficult to reconcile, especially once the
particular facts of the cases are brought to bear.
In Tank Truck, the Court articulated a test for non-deductibility that
began with the observation that "the frustration of state policy is most
complete and direct when the expenditure for which deduction is sought
is itself prohibited by statute." This seems quite reasonable-yet in the
Sullivan decision, the Court allowed the operator of an illegal bookmak-
ing operation a deduction for rent paid, even though payment of rent by a
bookmaking enterprise was itself directly prohibited by a state statute.129
The Court held in Tank Truck that "Deduction of fines and penalties
uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct fash-
ion by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty prescribed by the state legisla-
ture," yet found that the deduction at issue in Sullivan would not be "a
device to avoid the consequence of violations of a law." 130
Professor Walker argues that the different outcomes in the two cases
are the result of differential subsidy framing:
A striking difference between Tank Truck and Sullivan
lies in the choice of baseline and the framing of the opin-
ions, which are 180 degrees apart. In Tank Truck,
Clark's selection of a pre-deduction baseline causes de-
duction of fines to look like a subsidy for bad behavior,
direction of the gross income baseline, so we tend to conceptualize that move as the elimina-
tion of a subsidy.").
126 "Mental and rhetorical framing of deduction as subsidy has several important conse-
quences. A court's choice of baseline may largely determine the outcome of a case. Explicit
rhetorical framing of deduction as subsidy may yield sufficient votes to gamer a majority on
appeal or smooth reception. More concretely, subsidy framing may help explain judicial ap-
proval of the IRS's disallowance of a number of business deductions on public policy grounds.
Mental and rhetorical framing may also have contributed to the codification by Congress of
these and other public policy disallowances." Id. at 1271.
127 Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 30.
128 356 U.S. 27, 27 (1958).
129 Bernard Wolfman, et al., The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 235, 261 (1973) (citing la.. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 336 (1945)).
130 Comm'r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 29.
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reducing the "sting" of the penalties. Douglas's baseline
in Sullivan is allowance of "the normal deductions of ...
rent and wages." (footnote omitted) Douglas emphasizes
that the disallowance in Sullivan "would come close to
making this type of business taxable on the basis of its
gross receipts, while all other businesses would be taxa-
ble on the basis of net income." 13 1
This approach is appealing, but it leaves unanswered a crucial question:
why does the Court frame (either sincerely, or as a rhetorical device) one
disallowed deduction as a subsidy and the other as necessary to deter-
mine net income?
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,132 Congress codified many of the
traditional public policy disallowances, disallowing business expense de-
ductions for bribes, kickbacks, and any payments that are illegal under
state law, 133 as well as for fines and penalties assessed for the violation
of state law.134 The accompanying Senate report indicated that these ad-
ditions to the code were to replace the common law public policy disal-
lowances, and were to be seen as comprehensive.13 5
Yet the Tank Truck/Sullivan puzzle has reappeared in other con-
texts. For example, courts have struggled to determine the appropriate
tax treatment of court-ordered disgorgement of previously-taxed profits
from illegal activities: reasonable people could disagree as to whether
these payments should be deductible from income as losses under §165,
but it is difficult to come up with a policy rationale for treating court-
ordered disgorgement of illegal profits differently depending on what il-
legal enterprise gave rise to the profits. Yet this is precisely what tax
courts have done in treating the disgorgement of embezzlement proceeds
differently from the forfeiture of profits from drug trafficking.1 3 6
In 1983, Glen Wood pled guilty to importing marijuana and con-
spiracy to import marijuana. His sentence included a four-year prison
term and a $30,000 fine. In 1985, Wood paid $735,557 in back taxes,
tax fraud penalties and interest resulting from his failure to report
$600,000 in drug trafficking income on his 1978 and 1979 tax returns.
Wood then filed for a refund for tax year 1984 on the grounds that he had
forfeited the $600,000 to the government in that year, and was thus enti-
131 Walker, supra note 125 at 33.
132 Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 902 (b), (c), 83 STAT. 487, 710 (1969).
133 I.R.C. § 162(c). Note that this had the effect of overturning Sullivan.
134 I.R.C. § 162(f).
135 S. REP. No. 91-552 at 274 (1969).
136 See Andrew R. Shoemaker, The Smuggler's Blues: Wood v. United States and the
Resulting Horizontal Inequity Among Criminals in the Allowance of Federal Income Tax De-
ductions, 11 VA. TAX REv. 660 (1992).
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tied to a deduction for the forfeiture on his 1984 return.1 37 In Wood v.
United States, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the forfeiture was properly clas-
sified as a loss under § 165, but that the loss was disallowed because "It is
obvious, however, that the public policy embodied in this nation's drug
laws is not enhanced by allowing a tax deduction to offset a forfei-
ture."1 38 The court relied on Holt v. Commissioner (in which the value
of forfeited marijuana and vehicles was held non-deductible):
Holt observed that 'the primary purpose of such forfeit-
ures is to cripple illegal drug trafficking and narcotics
activities by depriving narcotics peddlers of the operat-
ing tools of their trade.' (footnote omitted). The legisla-
tive history of 21 U.S.C. § 881 reveals that the forfeiture
provision was designed to reach drug traffickers "where
it hurts the most."1 39
Quoting Tank Truck, the court ruled that "allowing a loss deduction
would certainly 'take the sting' out of a penalty intended to deter drug
dealing." 140 Note that the court is unmoved by the fact that the taxpayer
received four years in prison and a $30,000 fine as punishment for his
crimes before disgorging the $600,000 in ill-gotten gains.
Contrast this with the treatment of repayment of embezzled
funds. 141 The courts have sometimes held that deducting restitution pay-
ments would frustrate public policy if the payments were direct substi-
tutes for punitive payments meted out by the criminal court, as part of a
deal for a stayed sentence, for example,1 42 but this finding has not been
consistent. In Spitz v. United States,14 3 the Court held that a $5,000 resti-
tution payment made as a condition of probation was deductible from
income. In Stephens v. Commissioner, decided one year after Wood, the
tax court ruled that the $530,000 principal portion of $1,000,000 in resti-
tution (including interest) paid to a former employer in lieu of an addi-
tional prison term was non-deductible on public policy grounds similar to
those cited in Wood, but the Second Circuit reversed this decision.144
Much like the court in Wood, the Circuit court quoted extensively from
Tank Truck, but to the opposite effect, finding that allowing the deduc-
tion would not "reduce the sting" of the penalties Stephens faced, but
rather that "disallowing the deduction for repaying the funds would in
137 Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 418 (1989).
138 Id. at 421.
139 Id. (quoting Holt v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 75, 80 (1977)); H.R.REP. No. 98-1030 (1984).
140 Id. at 422.
141 For full description of the following cases, see Shoemaker, supra note 136.
142 See, e.g., Bailey v. Comm'r, 756 F.2d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1985); Waldman v. Comm'r, 88
T.C. 1384, 1385 (1987), affd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988).
143 432 F. Supp. 148, 149-50 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
144 Stephens v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 667, 674 (2nd Cir. 1990).
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effect result in a 'double sting.' If the deduction were disallowed, Ste-
phens would pay approximately $30,000 in taxes on income he did not
retain, in addition to the restitution payment."1 4 5 The court seemed par-
ticularly moved by the "stem sentence" Stephens had already received: 5
years in prison and $16,000 in fines.
In all of the above cases, taxpayers were seeking deduction for
money paid to the government on pain of imprisonment. In all cases the
taxpayers were found to be deserving of deduction based on the statutory
definition of losses. But in the drug cases, these losses were disallowed
based on questionable deterrence rationales not applied in the embezzle-
ment cases. Why is non-deductibility a "double sting" in one set of
cases, but necessary to preserve existing criminal law deterrents in an-
other? In both instances, the taxpayers were engaged in the violation of
federal and state statutes evincing "sharply defined public policy" against
their profit-making behaviors.
Traditional analysis cannot answer this question. Professor Walker's
implicit subsidy theory has some purchase-with the language of
"double stings" and "taking the sting out" standing in for clearer refer-
ence to subsidy-but cannot explain the differential treatment.
Attention to social meaning can bring these threads together. When
judges are operating in hotly contested cultural spaces, they are moved
by the cultural values that the law (as they interpret it) expresses. Like
the legislators in Nevada concerned about the tax code's ability to place
brothels within the ambit of "normal businesses," one can imagine that a
judge would struggle more with reading "ordinary and necessary" busi-
ness expenses to encompass punitive fines than rent paid, even though
the rent payments were actually illegal. Similarly, while the action of
white-collar embezzlers is hardly praiseworthy, it does not (and certainly
did not in the 1970s and 1980s) compare to the behavior of "narcotics
peddlers,"1 4 6 and thus courts may be less comfortable approving loss de-
ductions for the forfeiture of their tools of the trade or ill-gotten gains.
Professor Walker notes that subsidy framing could be simply ex-
post rhetoric, but I would argue that his theory that "subconscious fram-
ing of deduction as subsidy" influences the public policy disallowance
decisions fits well with an expressive theory of tax. Just as legislators are
not necessarily disingenuous when using "incentive" language rather
than pure expressive appeals,1 47 and advocates for and against the death
penalty conform their assessments of its deterrence value to their expres-
sive beliefs,14 8 expressive concerns contribute to the justices' determina-
145 Id. at 671.
146 See Holt, 69 T.C. at 80.
147 Walker, supra note 125.
148 See Schlafly, supra note 87and accompanying text.
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tions in the Tank Truck and Sullivan decisions, as well as the many lower
court and legislative public policy disallowances.
In fact, the McGlotten court's decision with respect to the interac-
tion of the tax exemption for fraternal organizations with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 makes an often subconscious analytic move explicit. Recall
that in order to find that a tax provision violates the Civil Rights Act, the
court must find that the provision constitutes a subsidy.149 In order to
distinguish a tax subsidy from other tax provisions, the court does not
look to tables of tax expenditures, or a coherent definition of income or
theory of the appropriate taxation of nonprofits.
Instead, the court states of the tax exemption for fraternal orders
(especially their passive investment income): "Since it is available only
to particular groups, it operates in fact as a subsidy in favor of the partic-
ular activities these groups are pursuing."o5 0 Now, the availability of any
given tax provision to some groups and not others (businesses not indi-
viduals, individuals with particular types of income, etc.) occurs fre-
quently in any net income tax system, but the McGlotten court had
already decided, in addressing the plaintiff's equal protection claims, that
offering particular benefits to particular organizations had the effect of
"indicating approval" of the organizations and thus "aiding" their dis-
crimination through the provision of tax benefits. A code provision that
draws distinctions among organizations indicates approval of those that
receive benefits, and this approval itself constitutes aid and defines the
provision as a subsidy in the minds of the justices. When the tax code
expresses inappropriate values, judges are more likely to view the code
as a deviation from the normal income tax baseline, and find that this
deviation constitutes "frustration" of public policy.
3. Drugs are Different: From "Peddlers" to Entrepreneurs
The above drug trafficking cases did not involve deductions for or-
dinary and necessary business expenses-in 1982, Congress had enacted
a prohibition on all business expense deductions (other than cost of
goods sold) for drug traffickers, based explicitly in the pre-existing pub-
lic policy doctrine. IRC §280E, inserted into the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 19821s' as an amendment by Senator William L.
Armstrong of Colorado,1 5 2 provides:
149 See supra Section C(l)(c). The court must find that the provision constitutes "federal
financial assistance."
150 McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 462.
151 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, PuB. L. No. 97-248, § 351, 96
STAT. 324, 640 (1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 280E).
152 S. 2212, 97th Cong. (1982). A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
disallow a deduction for expenses paid or incurred in connection with the illegal sale of drugs.
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No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business if such trade or business (or the
activities which comprise such trade or business) con-
sists of trafficking in controlled substances.153
The provision was a direct response to a tax court ruling from a year
earlier, Edmonson v. Commissioner, in which a retail drug dealer was
allowed various business expense deductions against his drug-related in-
come.154 The Commissioner did not argue that the deductions should be
denied as frustrating public policy, and the tax court did not address the
issue, as Treasury considered the public policy disallowances codified in
the 1969 tax reform act to be a complete replacement for the common
law doctrine.' 55
The Senate report accompanying § 280E's enactment explained the
provision thusly:
There is a sharply defined public policy against drug
dealing. To allow drug dealers the benefit of business
expense deductions at the same time that the U.S. and its
citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such
persons is not compelled by the fact that such deductions
are allowed to other, legal, enterprises. Such deductions
must be disallowed on public policy grounds. 15 6
It is unlikely that this code section has had much marginal deter-
rence effect on illegal drug sales or dramatically increased the sanctions
apprehended drug traffickers face. But the introduction of the section
certainly allowed legislators to ensure that the tax code, like other federal
laws, expressed unequivocal condemnation of drug traffickers. It was
thus passed uncontroversially.
But § 280E is no longer uncontroversial-it has become part of a
heated conflict over the federal tax treatment of marijuana dispensaries
that are now legal under state law in many states. In nearly half of the
states, marijuana is legal for medicinal purposes, and eight states and the
153 I.R.C. § 280E (1982).
154 Edmondson v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. 1533 (1981).
155 See Nikola Vujcic, Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code and Medical Mari-
juana Dispensaries: an Interpretation Based On Statutory Purpose, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
249, 258-59 (2016). After the 1969 tax reform act codified the existing public policy disal-
lowances, treasury had issued a regulation stating: "A deduction for an expense paid or in-
curred after December 30, 1969, which would otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall
not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply de-
fined public policy." Treas. Reg. §1.162-1(a) (1975).
156 S. REP. No. 97-494, at 309 (1982).
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District of Columbia 57 have legalized it for recreational use as well.
There has been a substantial shift over the last two decades in public
opinion regarding marijuana,' 58 and in places where marijuana sales are
blessed by the state, the social meaning of "trafficking" in marijuana has
changed dramatically.
III. THE SECRET AMBITION OF "INCENTIVE"
The preceding discussions have introduced an important theme in
the expressive theory of tax: the use of "incentive" language as a replace-
ment for explicit appeals to expressive values. Understanding the compli-
cated meaning of such language can help scholars identify expressive
battles even when they are being waged under the cover of more tradi-
tional tax policy discourse.
As Dan Kahan explains in The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,15 9
when citizens and lawmakers debate controversial topics in criminal law,
they frequently turn to deterrence arguments to justify their positions, as
these arguments are more acceptable within liberal political discourse
than explicit struggles for symbolic expression. But this "deterrence talk"
does not necessarily reflect the true feelings and motivations of speakers.
Death penalty advocacy is a good example: research on public opin-
ion about the death penalty indicates that people frequently speak in de-
terrence terms because they feel that these arguments are seen as more
"scientific" or reasonable.1 60 Members of Congress similarly feel that
policy appeals based on a deterrence rationale seem more "rational" and
thus "legitimate" than saying simply "the bastard deserved it."161 When
pressed on their motivations, however, many citizens and lawmakers
who support the death penalty talk about the importance of communicat-
ing society's unequivocal condemnation of certain acts,1 62 or of af-
firming the virtue and status of law-abiding citizens. Opponents of
capital punishment frequently cite the devaluation of the lives of offend-
157 See State Marijuana Laws in 2016 Map, GOVERNING MAG. (Mar. 23, 2017), http://
www.governing.com/gov-datalstate-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html.
158 Today, 57 percent of U.S. adults say the use of marijuana should be made legal, while
37 percent say it should be illegal. A decade ago, opinion on legalizing marijuana was nearly
the reverse-just 32 percent favored legalization, while 60 percent were opposed. Abigail
Geiger, Support for Marijuana Legalization Continues to Rise, PEw RESEARCH CENTER (Oct.
12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/12/support-for-marijuana-legaliza-
tion-continues-to-rise/.
159 See generally Kahan, supra note 17 (arguing that "deterrence talk" serves an important
function within liberal discourse, cooling overheated debates over cultural status).
160 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116,
145-49 (1983).
161 See Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic
Politics, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 157, 176 (1983).
162 Id. at 166.
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ers or the "brutalization" of our society as primary harms associated with
the death penalty. Though people on both sides of the debate marshal
endless deterrence-based arguments in support of their positions, experi-
ments show that few people are persuaded by empirical evidence contra-
dicting their intuitions about deterrence, 163 and a large majority of survey
respondents freely admit that they would not change their position on the
death penalty even if they were shown definitive evidence contradicting
their beliefs about its deterrent effects.'"
Cheap deterrence talk is pervasive in debates about gun control as
well: battles over gun control are freighted with cultural meaning, pitting
rugged frontier individualism against liberal Eastern urbanism in a fight
for societal recognition and cultural status. While both proponents and
opponents of gun control bolster their arguments with appeals to the re-
duction of crime, 16 5 beliefs about crime effects of gun control are pre-
dicted by cultural attachment and do not appear to actually motivate
policy preferences.166 In fact, most people who claim that they support
gun control because it would reduce crime admit in their response to
follow-up questions that they don't actually believe that crime will go
down if gun control is enacted. 1 67
These examples demonstrate how expressive concerns can at times
be the dominant-or at least a very significant-motivation behind pol-
icy preferences or analytic decisions that are outwardly staged on other
grounds. This phenomenon, I will argue, underwrites many of the most
contentious arguments about the economic effects of particular tax poli-
cies, with dueling economic justifications frequently providing public
cover for the expressive battles lurking just below the surface. Very few
tax policy debates are as overtly expressive as the Nevada brothel tax
debate or the fight between David Cameron and J.K. Rowling over "rec-
163 JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 239, 242-43 (John Hagan ed., 1997).
164 Ellsworth and Ross, supra note 1600 (noting that "[riespondents were generally igno-
rant on factual issues related to the death penalty, and indicated that if their factual beliefs (in
deterrence) were incorrect, their attitude would not be influenced").
165 Gun control proponents argue that stricter gun control will decrease violent crime,
while opponents argue that an armed citizenry provides and effective deterrent to violent crim-
inality. See Kahan supra note 159, at 451.
166 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1321 (2003) ("While predictably
failing to change anyone's mind, empirical analyses do reinforce the conviction of those who
already accept their conclusions that a rational and just assessment of the facts must support
their position.").
167 Kahan, supra note 17, at 452 (citing GARY KLECK, PoIrr BLANK: GUNS AND Vio-
LENCE IN AMERICA 370 (Michael Useem & James D. Wright eds., 1991)); ROBERT J. SPITZER,
THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 121 (1995); DON B. KATES JR., PUBLIC OrimON: THE EF-
FECTS OF EXTREMIST DISCOURSE ON THE GUN DEBATE, IN THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE
93, 95 (Don B. Kates Jr. & Gary Kleck eds., 1997).
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ognition" of marriage at the expense of unmarried mothers, but we
should not assume that debates framed in other terms are devoid of ex-
pressive motivation.
A. Cheap Incentive Talk
Just as "deterrence talk" in criminal law frequently obscures the
more fundamental cultural concerns that are the true drivers of legislative
and public opinion on culturally charged issues like the death penalty and
gun control, many fundamentally expressive battles in the tax realm are
clothed in the language of incentives, efficiency, or distributional fair-
ness. Talk of incentives, and especially "penalties" and "rewards," can
easily be understood as expressive as well as instrumental.
This is not to say that policymakers are not concerned about the true
instrumental effects of tax policy legislation-only that we cannot take
talk of incentives at face value, and we should not automatically construe
ambiguous words like "reward" as synonymous with real economic in-
centive. Rewards and punishments in the tax code may be valuable for
expressive reasons even if they are ineffective at changing behavior, just
as prison may be valued over drug treatment for the moral condemnation
it expresses, even if prison is markedly less effective than treatment at
reducing drug offenses. Policymakers are willing to spend vast amounts
of money to reward marriage whether or not marriage penalties affect
marital decisions, because the "reward" they are concerned about is pri-
marily expressive, not instrumental. They would like to increase mar-
riage rates, but they are not overly concerned with the efficacy of their
attempts, as long as those attempts express to the public that Congress
values marriage and family. Recall also that individuals' factual percep-
tions of the efficacy of incentives (whether the death penalty deters, for
example) are generally contingent on their cultural attachments and
highly resistant to contrary data.
Attention to the importance of expressive concerns does not demand
that we view legislators as consciously valuing expressive goals over in-
strumental effects at every turn-in reality, we should expect that legisla-
tors both assign some independent value to expression and hold firm
beliefs about incentive efficacy that conform to their cultural attach-
ments. "Reward," "penalize," and "incentivize" are thus not necessarily
strategic code words, though they certainly can be deployed disingenu-
ously. Instead, they are frequently authentic representations of a poorly-
defined mix of expressive and (culturally-informed) instrumental
concerns.
This insight can help us solve a persistent puzzle in many tax policy
debates: why are lawmakers frequently enamored of tax incentives that
have been repeatedly demonstrated ineffective? Is it just stupidity, dis-
AN ExPREssIvE THEORY OF TAX
honesty, or corruption on the part of political actors? Or is there some-
thing that traditional analysis is missing?
B. "Rewarding" Savings, "Encouraging" Thrift, Changing Nothing
The Internal Revenue Code is replete with tax-preferences for re-
tirement savings allegedly designed to increase savings on the part of
workers. These tax expenditures are projected to amount to over $165
billion this fiscal year alone,16 8 or more than 10 percent of total income
tax revenues for the year. 169 This incentive talk is anything but cheap.
Unfortunately, available empirical evidence indicates that these pro-
visions do an extremely poor job as incentives. 170 Coverage and take-up
are patchy, with about 55 percent of workers completely left out of all
tax-preferred savings programs.1 7 1 Among workers who are covered, it
appears that tax-preferred savings accounts induce much shifting of sav-
ings into tax-preferred accounts from other vehicles, but fail to induce
any additional saving by plan participants. 17 2 Furthermore, retirement
savings incentives flow predominantly to high-income households who
are already capital-rich and over-insured, providing tax windfalls to fam-
ilies in least need of increased retirement security. 173
While economists have been questioning the efficacy and efficiency
of retirement savings incentives for at least 20 years, the political appe-
tite for these incentives is unabated. They were popular during the Clin-
ton administration. Over the course of the George W. Bush
168 President's Fiscal Year 2013 Budget, Analytical Perspectives, 252 at table 17.1. This
figure includes the net exclusion for contributions and earnings for employer pension plans,
401(k)-type plans, Individual Retirement Accounts, and self-employed plans (Keogh plans),
and the saver's credit.
169 Id. at 187 at table 15.1.
170 Lily Batchelder, Savings Incentives with Insurance Objectives: A Bankrupt Approach?
(work in progress).
171 See Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation: Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) Data, 2006, 30:2 EBRI NoTEs 2 (2009).
172 See, e.g., William Gale and Benjamin Harris, Savings And Retirement: How Does
Tax-Favored Retirement Saving Affect National Saving?, TAX POLICY CENTER BRIEFING BOOK
(2007) ("The earliest research on both traditional defined-benefit pensions and defined-contri-
bution plans appeared to demonstrate very strong effects on private wealth and saving. These
efforts, however, were marred by a series of econometric and statistical problems. More recent
research, using improved methods, has found significantly smaller impacts of tax-preferred
saving vehicles on private saving and wealth, and in some cases has found no net effects on
private wealth at all."); See also Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale, and Peter R. Orszag, The
Fiscal Gap and Retirement Saving Revisited, TAX NOTES, 431(2004); Eric M. Engen, William
G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz, The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives on Saving, J. EcoN.
PERSP. 113 (1996).
173 See Batchelder, supra note 170; Eric J. Toder, Benjamin H. Harris and Katherine Lim,
Distributional Effects of Tax Expenditures, TAX POL'Y CENTER (July 21, 2009), http://www
.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID-411922 (nearly 80 percent of the benefit of re-
tirement savings accrues to the top quintile of earners).
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Administration, existing incentives were expanded and new provisions
added. President Obama proposed to expand the Saver's Credit to cover
more low-income households and provide larger subsidies. While this is
certainly an improvement from a distributional standpoint, a much more
efficient way to change the distributional effects of savings incentives
would be to eliminate them and invest the resulting revenue in expan-
sions of progressive programs. Why are "incentives" that do so little to
change private behavior and cost so much so beloved?
Because they say the right thing about the people they target. Saving
for the future is a virtue deserving of recognition and reward, regardless
of whether the system of rewards actually induces more people to save.
By exempting savings from taxation, especially the savings of hard-
working households socking away funds for a modest retirement, or a
first home purchase, or an education (all of which may be paid for with
tax-preferred savings), we ordain a social ideal. Given that the current
slate of savings incentives is largely ineffective, but spends precious re-
sources providing windfalls to people who save, one might expect sup-
port for them to dwindle as household savings rates decline and fewer
households benefit monetarily. This has not been the case, and the ex-
pressive function of savings incentives provides an explanation: pro-
pounding a cultural ideal is an aspirational endeavor. Expressive
concerns are often most salient and powerful when cherished values
seem most besieged. It is thus unsurprising that during a time of balloon-
ing debt, easy money and record-low saving, Americans would place
even more value on legislative expression of the virtues and values they
see slipping away.
Increasing national saving and retirement security are laudable
goals, and new empirical work on program design could lead to in-
creased participation and incentive effectiveness. 1 7 4 But it is notable that
proposals to directly increase national savings and retirement security
through, for example, a Social Security expansion and deficit reduction
funded through increased taxes, are not central to the "savings incentive"
debate. This approach would be much more efficient at achieving both
instrumental goals of retirement savings incentives, but it would not ex-
press Congressional approval for individual thrift-in fact, it would re-
lieve individuals of the need to be fiscally virtuous-and thus, is not
expressively appealing. Again, there are many ideological and practical
174 See, e.g. Esther Duflo, William G. Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag, and Emman-
uel Saez, Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field
Experiment with H&R Block, Q. J. EcON. 1311-46 (2006); Emmanuel Saez, Details Matter:
The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-up of Financial Incentives for Retire-
ment Saving, AM. EcON. J.: EcoN. POL'Y 1, 204-28 (2009).
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concerns motivating lawmakers, but expressive goals are frequently im-
portant, and can help to explain otherwise puzzling choices.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DESIGN
Expressive theory provides a powerful positive framework for un-
derstanding tax policy, shedding light on otherwise puzzling debates and
decisions. But expressive theory can have normative weight as well. It is
easy to dismiss expressive concerns as being just so much rhetoric, or
representing ignorance or irrationality on the part of policymakers and
citizens, but that would be a mistake. Social meaning matters. People
care deeply about their standing in society, and about what our criminal
laws, our constitution, and our tax code say about it.175 It may thus at
times be right to choose policies with otherwise sub-optimal instrumental
effects if they express the right thing about our society's values.
Expressive theory has a number of implications for policy design
and advocacy. The easiest piece involves simply being smarter about
rhetoric-if your opponents are arguing about values and virtues and you
are tempted to refute them with a spreadsheet, rethink your approach.
More interestingly, creative policy design can align expressive goals with
instrumental goals.
A. Example: How Expressive Taxation Could Bolster the Taxation of
Intergenerational Wealth Transfers
1. The Death of the Death Tax
At the time of its delayed temporary repeal in the Economic Growth
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,176 the estate tax, in place for
85 years, affected less than 2 percent of the population, and was the most
progressive element of the U.S. tax code.177 Yet its repeal moved from a
fringe issue, of concern primarily to a small number of extremely
175 Expressive value enters directly into their utility function.
176 The recent legislative history of the estate tax is incredibly complicated. Most provi-
sions of EGTRRA (including changes to income tax rates, "marriage penalty relief' and a
number of other tax policy changes) phased in slowly over the 10-year budget window, then
expired at the end of ten years. This structure was adopted to avoid triggering budget rules
that would have required 60 votes in the Senate. In the case of the estate tax, the exemption
was gradually increased and the rate gradually decreased over the 10 years until the tax was
completely repealed in 2010. The tax was then scheduled to spring back in 2011 at its pre-
2001 levels. Much to the chagrin of Congressional Democrats, repeal occurred as scheduled in
2010. Congress then passed another expiring measure to prevent the application in 2011 of the
pre-2001 tax; estates in 2011 and 2012 benefitted from a substantially higher exemption and a
substantially lower rate. Then in early 2013, the "fiscal cliff" deal (encompassing the so-called
"Bush tax cuts" and the sequestration deal enacted during prior negotiations) permanently
reinstated the estate tax with a higher exemption and lower rate than the lowest-revenue itera-
tion (2009) of the EGGTRA repeal phase-in.
177 Graetz and Shapiro, supra note 3,at 1.
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wealthy families, to a central theme of George W. Bush's tax cutting
rhetoric, and a point of bipartisan agreement in the Senate. This sea
change cannot be chocked up to corruption or backroom deals with spe-
cial interests-when polled, a majority of Americans supported repeal of
the "death tax."' 78 What happened?
In their comprehensive, authoritative book Death by a Thousand
Cuts, Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro explore this puzzle from every
angle. They chronicle the birth of a diverse repeal coalition, the creation
by conservative think-tanks of the intellectual underpinnings of the re-
peal movement, the prosecution of an aggressive electoral and legislative
strategy, and the flows of money that made it all possible. While all of
these elements were important, Graetz and Shapiro also take very seri-
ously the repeal movement's success at swaying public opinion with
moral arguments about what social values the tax code ought to re-
present, and who should and should not be "punished" with a tax bill.
Graetz and Shapiro name Frank Luntz, a prominent Republican
pollster, "the most important player in reshaping the rhetoric of estate tax
politics." Luntz encouraged the repeal coalition to personalize the estate
tax by focusing on sympathetic families affected by the tax, and to fun-
damentally reframe it as a "tax on the American dream." He made exten-
sive use of focus groups to develop "four commonsense principles" that
repeal advocates should use to make their case to the public and their
lawmakers:
1. It is the wrong tax. It provides just one percent of the
nation's revenues, and it costs more to collect than
any other federal tax.
2. It comes at the wrong time. People shouldn't be bur-
dened at the most difficult time of their lives.
3. It hurts the wrong people. If you saved for the future,
put away money for your children, built a small busi-
ness, ran a family farm, or achieved the American
Dream in other ways, the Death Tax punishes you.
4. It helps the wrong people. The only people helped by
the estate tax are the fancy lawyers and expensive tax
accountants-and IRS agents. 179
Of these four principles, only one includes any reference to revenue, and
none appeals directly to ability-to-pay or other traditional distributional
concerns. These are primarily arguments about how the tax code con-
structs the social meaning of family wealth and the American Dream.
The estate tax is unfair because it punishes the virtues of hard work,
178 Id. at 122.
179 Id. at 81-82.
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thrift, entrepreneurship and generosity toward the next generation. By
contrast, the tax rewards culturally disfavored actors-lawyers, "high-
priced" accountants, and IRS bureaucrats-who gain by leeching off the
virtuous behavior of others.180
And where were the opponents of repeal while Luntz was defining
the terms of the expressive debate? They were stuck in traditional modes
of analysis. As Graetz and Shapiro write,
[W]hile the repeal forces made a moral case on one side,
their opponents left it unanswered. They argued about
the math of who pays and how much, without joining the
fight over questions of morality, fairness, and demo-
cratic values . . . The family farmers, the small business
owners, the Chester Thigpens, 1st all embody the work
ethic. They exemplify American virtue. The argument
for repeal became an argument about how these virtuous
Americans were being unjustly penalized by the death
tax. 182
Meanwhile, The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,18 3 probably
the most important force in the anti-repeal movement, issued publication
after publication explaining in detail the true incidence of the estate tax
(e.g. "Eliminating the Estate Tax: A Costly Benefit for the Wealthiest
Americans"),1 8 4 while the Brookings Institution assembled countless pa-
pers "debunking" the driest economic claims of repealers and running the
estate tax through traditional efficiency and equity analysis.' 85 None of
these actors were prepared to play the expressive game, and "but it's
only the top 2 percent!" could not compete with the values and virtues
180 Luntz is often cited, ruefully, by repeal opponents as the man who coined the great
rhetorical bogeyman "death-tax"-viewed by many as an Orwellian turn-of-phrase so power-
ful that it completely changed the terms of the debate around estate taxation. Id. While the
transformation of the estate tax into the "death tax" exemplifies Luntz's every-word-counts
approach to message discipline, placing outsize focus on a single change in nomenclature
trivializes the remarkable way in which he and the rest of the repeal coalition used rhetoric to
claim the moral and expressive high ground. They did not just focus-group the phrase "death
tax" and apply it broadly, they used every available microphone to define the phrase's expres-
sive content until "death tax" became shorthand for a an entire narrative of unfair punishment
of virtuous Americans. Id.
181 An African American octogenarian tree farmer from Mississippi who, after testifying
before the Ways and Means Committee in 1995, became a key figure in death tax folklore.
182 Graetz and Shapiro, supra note 3, at 227.
183 Disclosure: I have worked for CBPP in the past, including on estate tax issues, and
think very highly of their staff and their work.
184 Graetz and Shapiro, supra note 3, at 227.
185 Id.
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frames of the repeal movement. In fact, constant focus on how few peo-
ple pay the estate tax may have backfired. 186
One lesson of the estate tax debate is that policy advocates must pay
attention to social meaning when choosing their rhetorical arguments.
Expressive arguments for the estate tax would have explicitly contested
the meaning of the tax with respect to the values espoused by repealers,
or attempted to focus the discussion on a different set of values alto-
gether. A family farmer is a powerful symbol, but so is Paris Hilton-by
turning the focus away from thrifty, entrepreneurial parents and toward
profligate, non-working heirs, estate tax proponents could have chal-
lenged the meaning of the estate tax with respect to the values of hard
work and thrift. Americans believe that parents should be able to work
to create a better life for their children, but they also believe strongly in
an ideal of equality of opportunity.187 These are conflicting values that
point in different directions on the estate tax, and the social meaning of
the tax in any given context will depend a great deal on which value is
dominant in the discussion. The repeal coalition was successful in both
setting the terms of the expressive debate and defining the meaning of
estate taxation within that debate. Charts and graphs explaining the
progressivity of the estate tax, or attempting to tie the tax's revenue to
favored government programs did not address this social meaning.
But there is a deeper lesson for tax policy design: if there is a policy
that is equivalent or superior to the estate tax from a traditional tax policy
perspective, and also expresses appropriate social values, lawmakers
should adopt that policy.
2. Social Meaning and Transition to an Inheritance Tax
Professor Lily Batchelder has laid out the case for a move away
from estate taxation and toward inheritance taxation,188 which would ex-
plicitly tax heirs rather than decedents. 189 While most of Professor
186 "[T]he anti-repeal forces actually helped the repeal movement claim the moral victory.
The defenders of the estate tax sang a constant refrain, telling people 'you won't pay this tax,
only other people will, so it is in your interest to keep it.' This self-interest chorus allowed the
repeal coalitions to tell their members that their cause was righteous not selfish." See id.
187 Eighty-six percent of polled Americans either "completely agree" or "mostly agree"
that "Our society should do what is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal oppor-
tunity to succeed." PEw RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESs VALUES SURVEY,
APR. 2012 (Apr. 2012), http://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=1811658&pid=5 1&
ccid=51#top.
188 Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect From Heirs? The Case for a Compre-
hensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAx L. REV. 1 (2009).
189 Under the current system, intergenerational transfers at death are not taxable as in-
come to the heir-rather, the estate is taxed before it is distributed to heirs. An inheritance tax
would eliminate the taxation of the estate and instead tax distributions as income to heirs, with
special rules. Id. at 2-3.
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Batchelder's argument for the shift is based on potential benefits with
respect to traditional tax policy analysis-enhancing fairness' 90 and effi-
ciency,191 and providing an opportunity to remove unnecessary complex-
ityl 9 2-she additionally argues that the shift would improve "political
transparency:"
The fact that the estate and gift taxes focus by design on
the donor drives the public to believe that their economic
burdens also fall on donors in practice. Because all other
major sources of income are subject to the income tax,
many also erroneously may believe that heirs are taxed
on their inherited income under the income tax.
These understandable misconceptions have been
exploited by advocates of estate tax repeal who have
framed the estate tax as a double tax on the frugal, hard-
working, generous donor who is confronted by the
taxman at the moment of death. This portrayal is far
from accurate. As explained, the estate tax in fact
predominantly burdens heirs. And it is generally the only
tax that applies to extraordinarily large inheritances.
Nevertheless, the public could probably better un-
derstand the estate tax system's effects if its form more
transparently embodied its function. Doing so would en-
able the public to make a more informed decision about
how much resources heirs should have to share with so-
ciety relative to those who personally earn their
wealth.1 9 3
Professor Batchelder focuses on the rhetorical significance of the
choice of tax base here, and the "transparency" effect of matching the
statutory incidence of the tax to the actual incidence of the tax. But it is
also true that this shift in statutory incidence changes the expressive con-
tent of the code in a way that improves it directly, by ensuring that that
the law expresses appropriate cultural values. A comprehensive inheri-
tance tax could be simpler, more transparent, more efficient and more
equitable than the estate tax, and it would also get the expressive content
right by taxing ne'er-do-well heirs and heiresses instead of the accumu-
lated savings of business owners and entrepreneurs.
190 Since the empirical literature indicates that the majority of the true incidence of estate
taxes falls on heirs (in the form of reduced inheritances) not decedents, taxing heirs allows
more accurate calculation of ability to pay and calibration of taxes to the payor's position on
the income distribution. Id. at 17-19, 49.
191 Id. 26-44.
192 Id. at 56
193 Id. at 58
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To return to Congresswoman Dunn's quote from the beginning of
this Article:
The policy choices we make surrounding the death tax
go to the heart not just of our tax system but of who we
are as a society. How should we tax? Who should we
tax? What should we tax? What values does our tax sys-
tem reflect? Naturally our tax system is not neutral to
social values. Look at the values that are penalized
when a government imposes a death tax: Thrift. Conser-
vation. Entrepreneurship. Ingenuity. Family Businesses.
Family Farms. Families. 194
By taxing the unearned income of heirs rather than the "thrift," "conser-
vation," and "entrepreneurship" of donors, and the family farms and
businesses that resulted from these qualities, an inheritance tax reflects
the right social values, and is thus expressively superior to an estate tax.
Here there are expressive and traditional tax policy factors support-
ing reform, but a move to a tax that achieved expressive goals could
represent an improvement even if all incidental effects of the tax re-
mained unchanged. For example, under certain circumstances, whether
the government levels a payroll tax on workers or employers may not
change who really pays but may change the cultural valence of the tax in
important ways, by helping to frame an associated benefit as "earned," or
by requiring employers to pay "their fair share" toward benefits for their
employees, and these expressive concerns can be taken into account.
B. Even Cheap-er Incentive Talk
Just as alignment with expressive concerns strengthens good policy,
it can make bad policy less bad. Given the interest of the public and
legislators in enacting expressive tax provisions, in many cases advocates
for good tax policy will be more successful in mitigating damage if they
pay attention to the social meaning of the desired tax provisions. If a
policy is enacted for primarily expressive reasons, it should be structured
to lose as little revenue and create as few inequities and bad incentives as
possible.
This understanding could further bolster the push to convert many
income tax deductions into limited refundable credits. While refundable
credits provide the same value to all taxpayers regardless of income or
other tax liability, when tax subsidies for socially desirable behavior are
structured as deductions from taxable income, they have the effect of
providing a higher subsidy rate to higher income taxpayers (without evi-
dence that the positive externalities of the behavior increase with in-
194 Graetz and Shapiro, supra note 3, at 42.
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come) and providing no subsidy (or none at the margin) for taxpayers
with no tax liability. There is a strong efficiency argument for defaulting
all such provisions to limited refundable credits to avoid this odd out-
come. 19 5 This argument can be even stronger for deductions that serve
primarily expressive ends-to the extent that policymakers and citizens
attach value to the mere existence in the code of a tax preference for a
particular activity or group, but care less about the structure and size of
the preference, small refundable credits could maximize the expressive
bang-for-the-buck by reducing revenue loss and improving the distribu-
tional effects of the inefficient provisions. In fact, this is implicit in the
arguments made by proponents of conversion of, for example, the home
mortgage interest deduction (MID), which many tax policy experts
would likely eliminate altogether were it not for the "political impossibil-
ity" of such a move. 196
Viewed from a perspective of pure self-interest, broad support for
the MID is a bit puzzling -only 25 percent of tax filers claimed the MID
in 2012.197 This represents fewer than half of all homeowners. 198 And
the vast majority of the benefits flow to high-income households, with 77
percent of the value of the MID accruing to households with incomes
above $100,000 in 2012.199 Viewed from an efficiency standpoint the
MID leaves much to be desired.200 Viewed through an expressive lens,
195 See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable
Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 53 (2006).
196 See, e.g., Alan Viard, Proposal 8: Replacing the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction,
THE HAMILTON PROJECT: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO TAX POL'Y (Feb. 2013), https://www
.brookings.edulwp-content/uploads/2016/06/THP_15WaysFedBudget Prop8.pdf.
"The economic merits of a homeownership preference depend on whether homeowner-
ship generates spillover benefits for society as a whole, perhaps by promoting social stability
or by encouraging residents' neighborhood involvement. Rather than wading into this conten-
tious debate, however, this proposal accepts the political reality that complete removal of the
tax preference, or even of the mortgage deduction, is impossible, and instead seeks to target
the tax preference in a more rational manner. Opinion polls suggest that many Americans who
are unwilling to eliminate the mortgage deduction are willing to restrict it." (citing U.S. Voters
Trust Obama, Dems to Avoid Fiscal Cliff Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Tax The
Rich, But Don't Touch Medicare, Voters Say, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www
.quinnipiac.edulinstitutes-centers/pollinginstitute/national/release-detail/?ReleaselD=1821.
197 Mark P. Keightley, An Analysis of the Geographic Distribution of the Mortgage Inter-
est Deduction, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE at 4-5 (2014).
198 See, e.g., Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAw 549, 585-87 (2008)
(summarizing the arguments for subsidizing home ownership and the inappropriateness of the
MID as the tool for these subsidies); But see id. at 587-588 (arguing that the MID may reduce
investment distortions as between owner-occupied housing and other investment vehicles for
homeowners with assets).
199 Will Fischer and Chye-Ching Huang, Mortgage Interest Deduction is Ripe for Reform,
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORrTHs (2013), http://www.cbpp.org/research/mortgage-
interest-deduction-is-ripe-for-reform.
200 See, e.g., Stephen G Cecchetti and Kermit L. Shoenholtz, Why the mortgage interest
tax deduction should disappear, but won't, MONEY & BANKING (June 8, 2015), http://www
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however, support for the deduction makes more sense. To quote pollster
Celinda Lake, when discussing a building-industry funded poll favorable
to the MID, "Despite the current housing downturn, Americans still see
homeownership as a core value and a key building block of being in the
middle class and creating strong jobs in their communities. ."201 If the
key function of the MID is expressing American's support for the "core
value" of homeownership, that expressive goal can be achieved more
cheaply and efficiently through a limited refundable credit, but cannot be
achieved through repeal. 202
CONCLUSION
This Article suggests that tax scholars must begin to pay more care-
ful attention to social meaning if they are to understand what is really
driving tax policy debates and be effective in shaping those debates.
They must be as attuned to what message a given tax provision is send-
ing about who and what our society values as they are to the provision's
instrumental effects on behavior, revenue, and the distribution of income.
In some cases, the battle over social meaning is so heated that it
dominates every other policy concern-Nevada's anti-prostitution legis-
lators are so loath to lend any gloss of legitimacy to the sex trade that
they are willing to forgo revenue and actually provide tax preferences to
prostitution (incentivizing purchase of sexual services at the margin and
increasing the monetary well-being of brothel owners in the process) to
avoid a formal recognition of the industry's existence in the state tax
code. In most cases the role of social meaning is more subtle, but no less
crucial. Recurring fights over the estate tax and the tax treatment of mar-
ried couples demonstrate that expressive concerns can dominate tradi-
tional analysis even in less obviously culturally-charged tax debates,
whether those expressive motivations are explicit or hidden. The case of
retirement savings incentives shows how greater attention to social
meaning can help scholars explain even the driest tax policy debates.
The greater understanding provided by expressive theory can help
tax scholars to be more effective advocates for sound policy, and also to
.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2015/6/3/why-the-mortgage-interest-tax-deduction-
should-disappear-but-wont.
201 Voters Strongly Support Politicians Who Embrace Pro-Housing Policies, Mortgage
Deduction, Poll Finds, NEW YORK STATE BUILDER's Ass'N (2011), https://nysba.com/news-
info/consumer-information/1 9
-voters-strongly-support-politicians-who-embrace-pro-housing-
policies-mortgage-deduction-poll-finds.
202 More radically, scholars could advocate for novel expressions of societal approval in
the tax code, like prizes, raffles run by the IRS, or plaudits in the Congressional Record. As J.
K. Rowling put it, "Half a billion pounds, to send a message-would it not be more cost-
effective, more personal, to send all the lower-income married people flowers?" Rowling,
supra note 48.
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design policies that both satisfy traditional efficiency, equity, and sim-
plicity norms and give expression to important cultural values. This en-
deavor requires scholars to engage more deeply with research into public
opinion, social psychology, and political economy, but it will greatly en-
rich both tax scholarship and tax policymaking.
